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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Discussions around the effects of the COVID-19 crisis and its impacts and costs are moving swiftly 
from health concerns to economic and social concerns. The ways in which countries are dealing with 
COVID-19 itself, through social lockdowns and school closures, are expected to have wide-ranging 
social and economic costs and governments have responded with rapid implementation of fiscal 
stimulus and social protection reforms. 
COVID-19 is a global health crisis, with severe economic consequences, impacting countries and 
continents in waves, and therefore is – with the exception of the Spanish Flu in 1918 – without a 
recent comparator. Necessarily this means that experience with, and evidence for, dealing with such 
a crisis is limited. 
Acknowledging that health, economic, and social crises can rapidly become a crisis for children, this 
paper seeks to contribute evidence to understanding what the crisis means for children and for 
families with children in the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (from here on 
referred to simply as ECA countries). In particular, what governments and stakeholders should be 
looking for when seeking to protect children from the worst outcomes of the crisis. In doing so, this 
paper asks: through which mechanisms can COVID-19 affect children in the region; what can we learn 
from previous crises about the potential effects on children and those who care for children; how is 
vulnerability to poverty and child well-being likely to be affected; are initial government responses to 
the crisis likely to worsen or mitigate risks to children’s well-being; and, how might future public 
policies be optimised in the short and medium term to protect child outcomes? 
The story of this crisis, like all economic and social crises, is one of inequality. Pre-existing inequality 
will determine who suffers most in these times. Inequality in the initial responses to the crisis will 
further exacerbate underlying inequalities. When exiting the crisis, policies designed to help societies 
recover, like stimulus and austerity, can also be unequal due to the huge private and public costs that 
follow. At the time of writing, many states in ECA countries can still manage the crisis recovery in 
ways that do not exacerbate inequalities for children and families while protecting their futures. The 
timing of this report, aimed at better understanding regarding the management of global and national 
public policy action to protect children and help develop future public policy for children based on 
equity and sustainability, is critical. 
No one group in society better represents the future than the child population. Therefore, child-
sensitive approaches to crisis recovery – ensuring that children are protected from harm, that their 
services are ring-fenced, and they are seen as a priority group in the response – are not simply driven 
by good intentions but should be seen as a key part of ensuring future generations avoid crises such 
as COVID-19. 
The main findings of this report are as follows: 
  Based on the experience of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), gross domestic product (GDP) per-
capita is likely to fall in the region – and be protracted in some cases. GDP is strongly associated 
with many of the child-focussed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the region, including 
poverty, child mortality, and youth activation.
  Multiple child poverty and vulnerability indicators will worsen within the first year following a 
decline in economic conditions – if not immediately.
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  Based on GDP per capita trends after 2008, the downturn lasted at least two years for the majority of 
countries and for many, the recovery to pre-2008 levels took as long as 8 to 10 years. This indicates 
medium- and long-term risks to families and children; risks lasting until the 2030 SDG deadline. 
  Evidence also suggests that the effect of falling incomes in the region will influence families and 
children unequally, with vulnerable people more affected than the average population; in particular, 
those at risk of extreme poverty and undernourishment, and young people in the labour market.
  Other economic and social preconditions are also determinants of poverty and well-being in the 
region and will moderate the effects of the crisis in some countries such as lower income inequality, 
higher employment rates (including rates of labour formalisation), and the size of the service sector. 
These will be affected by the crisis and therefore, will also require monitoring and stabilising. 
  Evidence shows that children’s health outcomes are associated with rates of out-of-pocket costs and 
on some occasions, healthcare service capacity. The overburdening of health systems related to 
COVID-19 will have repercussions for child and infant mortality unless mitigating policies are put in 
place. 
  Children’s individual risks, together with the needs of the families of those children, will be, to a 
large part, determined by the child’s characteristics, including age and gender. Specifically, younger 
children are at a higher risk of poverty as parents are less attached to the labour market and this 
age group often receives less public investment in normal times. Evidence shows COVID-19 social 
protection responses rarely take an age- or development-informed approach. 
  Evidence clearly suggests that rates of expenditure and staffing in health services are insufficient on 
their own to monitor and/or predict success for children. Issues of quality of services and conditions 
of investment matter and should be accounted for at a country level. 
  By mitigating the effects of economic contraction, the scope of social protection policies influencing 
the SDG outcomes studied here is shown to be significant. Even in cases where worsening 
economic conditions are not directly associated with the SDG outcome at hand (e.g., suicide), 
moderating factors such as employment rates and dependency ratios are meaningful for all 
measures in the longer-term.
  At the time of writing, 21 ECA countries are in national lockdown and schools are closed in 20 of 
those. Sixty-one social protection policies have been implemented, alongside 48 fiscal stimulus 
policies, and reported COVID caseloads range from fewer than 100 in Tajikistan to more than 1 
million in the Russian Federation and Turkey. Regarding COVID-19 responses: 
 – Policies presently being mapped are almost always targeted based on social demographics, 
means, or employment status. Universal responses are most commonly in the form of 
utility cost waivers. Pensions and family benefits make up one third of overall responses, 
employment related payments make up another one-third, and anti-poverty social assistance 
benefits, around one-sixth. 
 – The universal coverage of COVID-19 social protection benefits, with additional supports for 
those at greatest risk, is not being achieved in any of these countries. Although economic 
stimulus may be seen as a ‘population-wide’ response, it will not directly benefit the poorest 
groups. Where short-term or one-off cash transfers are provided for the poorest groups, these 
are not equivalent.
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 – In the majority of these countries, public interventions have favoured stimulation of business, 
providing more investment to fiscal stimulus packages, and delivering these directly to 
businesses through loans, offsetting business taxes, or providing wage subsidies. 
  SDG principles of ‘leave no-one behind’ are not being met in the design of social protection or fiscal 
stimulus responses in the region. Targeting and formal labour market attachment requirements 
dominate. Where benefits to families are universal, these amount to one-off payments in just three 
ECA countries. 
  Given the lessons of the persistence and depth of the post-GFC economic downturn in the region, 
one-off payments or benefits that exclude informal workers and the most poor and vulnerable, 
or which identify need based on existing vulnerabilities, will be wholly inadequate to address the 
needs of families and children in the short, medium and long term. 
  Families and children need long-term support in times of health and economic crisis. Evidence 
from previous crises presented in this report shows that social protection responses to crisis have 
contributed to protecting children from the worst effects, and that austerity has resulted in the 
closure of key child services, reduction in parental caregiving (and subsequent increase in children 
sent to care services), homelessness, crime, mental health problems and more concerning, further 
infectious disease outbreaks. Austerity is not inevitable and should be entirely avoided in ways that 
put social development goals for children – and their related investments – at risk. 
  Relatively high levels of investment in fiscal stimulus supporting business in general or by sector, 
plus the length of time allowed for interventions and the lack of clear conditionality in the majority 
of cases, is in contrast to social protection overall. Indeed, in the case of families with children, an 
argument should be made that equivalent investment and universality in access to support should 
replicate fiscal stimulus at minimum. Greater regulation, means-testing, and shorter windows of 
support could instead be applied to stimulus conditions for businesses.
 
This study provides evidence of the national experiences of COVID-19 and compares this across ECA 
countries. It is only the start of what is required when building evidence for children during COVID-19. 
National studies are also needed to represent the variation of experiences of children within a 
country: urban and rural; by gender; by age; and by migrant children, disabled children, and those in 
institutions. This is true to the message of the SDGs, and helps countries better understand which 
children receive adequate support when social protection is provided to families, at what levels, and 
under what conditions. 
What is clear from this study is that the COVID-19 crisis is engulfing entire societies across ECA 
countries, and will therefore inevitably impact family and child poverty and well-being in profound 
and long-lasting ways. Without strengthening initial responses with co-ordinated and adequate 
action for all children, COVID-19 will leave deep scars on a whole generation in the region.
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1. WHY LOOK AT HOW COVID-19 AFFECTS FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN SOUTHERN 
AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA? 
Discussion of the effects of the COVID-19 crisis, and the impacts and costs of the crisis, are moving 
swiftly from health concerns to economic and social concerns. Specifically, in recognition of 
countries’ public policy responses to dealing with COVID-19 – through lockdowns, travel restrictions, 
business and school closures – which will have wide-ranging social and economic costs. Government 
action across 23 ECA countries1 has underlined the potential health and economic consequences of 
COVID-19. At the time of writing, 21 ECA countries are in national lockdown, schools are closed in 20 
countries, and 61 social protection policies have been implemented alongside 48 fiscal stimulus 
policies (see Tables 4 and 5). 
But why focus on the impacts of children in ECA countries? This section answers this question from 
three perspectives: families with children as part of society; children who were among the most 
affected by previous crises; and the need to maintain focus on the longer-term goals and targets for 
children as part of the SDGs – which are at risk of stalling or, at worst, going into reverse in the 
coming years. 
Families with children as a part of society, the economy, and the world 
The predicted economic fallout from COVID-19 is based on a new reality where, in the most affected 
countries, most businesses and schools are being temporarily closed, and parents cannot work – 
other than from home. Together, these conditions will lead to: falls in productivity and consumption, 
businesses failing; poverty increasing; and an accumulation of debt defaults putting the entire 
financial system at risk of repeating the 2008 GFC. This in turn will lead to austerity and long-term 
scarring of social protection systems, and on children themselves. 
Both the pandemic and the government responses to it have social costs; not solely in terms of 
poverty and the risk to living standards, but through social isolation when mental ill health, for 
example, can occur.
As members of society, families and children will not escape the repercussions. Inevitably, some will 
experience these social costs differently. Large families living in cramped conditions, children living 
in households where interpersonal violence occurs or where parents have addictions, or children 
separated from their parents or other family members are examples. Intergenerational families with 
the stress of increased risk to elderly relatives, and families who will experience the emotional toll of 
bereavement need also to be considered. Finally, there are cases where children will be subjected to a 
combination of these factors. 
1 In this report the term Southern and Eastern European and Central Asian countries covers: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, the Republic of Moldova, 
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan.
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Children’s experiences of repercussions from previous health and economic crises
Evidence from the literature over the past two decades following crises and changes to the policies 
upon which children rely – social protection, education, and care services and health services – have 
been reformed and adapted. When these changes are made, and how they are made, have had 
meaningful impact on the children themselves and the world around them. Section 2.2 of this report 
summarizes the findings of a rapid review of evidence on the effects of the crisis on social protection 
and health, and related direct and indirect outcomes on children. Evidence clearly shows that the way 
governments respond to a crisis (whether nominally for children or not) has serious implications for 
child and family poverty, parental care, child mortality, health and nutrition, learning outcomes, 
parental labour market attachment, gender equality, parental mental health and suicide, homeless-
ness, and more. 
Emerging evidence predicting the short- and medium-term outcomes of the crisis, particularly 
around poverty risks (Sumner et al, 2020), confirms COVID-19 will be no different, and indeed will be 
more severe than the GFC, and children and young people will inevitably be affected, along with 
everyone else. 
Children’s rights and SDGs: Informing the decisions of policy makers and other stakeholders
The final reason to focus on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on children is the need to maintain 
focus on the longer-term social goals and targets for children as part of the SDGs. No group in society 
better represents the future than the child population. Therefore, child-sensitive approaches to crisis 
recovery – ensuring that children are protected from harm, that their services are ringfenced, and 
they are seen as a priority group in the response – are not simply driven by good intentions, but 
should be seen as a critical part of ensuring future generations avoid crises such as COVID-19. SDG 
goals are at risk should responses to the current crisis not fully account for the impact that public 
policy decisions will have on children.
The lifelong impact on individual children will constrain opportunity and create dependency, 
weakening social development and increasing the likelihood of future crises. 
At the time of writing, many states in ECA countries can still manage recovery from the crisis in ways 
that do not exacerbate inequalities affecting children and families and in doing so, protect their 
futures.
1.1 COVID-19 responses for families and children in ECA: Research questions 
To understand the ways in which COVID-19 affects families with children in ECA countries, and 
therefore how governments and other stakeholders can manage social policy responses that protect 
children from the negative repercussions of the crisis, the follow research questions will be 
addressed: 
1. Through which mechanisms can COVID-19 affect children in the region?
2. What can we learn about the potential effects on children and those who care for children from 
previous crises?
3. How is child well-being and vulnerability to poverty likely to be affected? 
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4. Are initial government social protection responses to the crisis likely to accentuate or mitigate 
risks to the well-being of children?
5. How might future public social policies be optimised, in the short- and medium-term, to protect 
children’s outcomes?
 
To address each question, the remainder of this report will be organized into five substantive 
sections. 
Section 2 will elaborate on how COVID-19 is affecting children, introducing a conceptual framework 
together with evidence from previous crises relevant to the ECA region, and the pathways through 
which selected child-focussed sustainable development goals are likely to be affected. This section 
will address research questions 1 and 2. 
Together, sections three, four, and five will address research question 3. Section three explores the 
preconditions likely to determine how detrimental the effects of the COVID-19 crisis and early 
responses – mapped by social protection, fiscal stimulus and closures, lockdowns and travel bans – 
will be on children and families in ECA countries through an exploration of economic, social, and 
demographic preconditions; child well-being outcomes; and COVID-19 caseloads. Section four 
undertakes empirical analysis of the preconditions in the region, relating them to trends in child 
outcomes as measured by child-relevant targets across seven SDGs in the areas of: poverty; 
nutrition; infant health; education; youth employment; and violence against children. Section five 
provides recommendations for monitoring key statistics based on these findings using data and 
findings from sections three and four. 
Finally, section six assesses if social protection and fiscal responses to the crisis have been fit for 
purpose, and where this is not the case, what social protection policies might work to protect all 
children from harm post-COVID-19. Research questions 4 and 5 are answered – drawing on evidence 
from the literature, the data and the empirical analysis in previous sections – and assess the role of 
social protection in preventing/ treating, social and economic risks at household and national levels 
following the COVID-19 pandemic. Also noted are issues such as: crisis effects on service delivery 
and in-kind benefits (healthcare utilization, food parcels); the need for fiscal stimulus (how and to 
whom); the need for mortgage, rent and tax relief, or loans (families or business); and the need for 
cash benefits in their various forms. 
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2. HOW IS COVID-19 AFFECTING CHILDREN?
This section introduces a conceptual framework for understanding the following: how crises like 
COVID-19 can influence children; evidence from previous crises relevant to the ECA region and public 
policy responses; and the child-focused sustainable development goals that are likely to be affected 
by the crises.
2.1 A conceptual frame for understanding how COVID-19 affects children
Although children have so far largely been spared the direct health effects of COVID-19, they are not 
immune from economic crises and are often among the hardest hit. Moreover, the response to 
controlling the spread of COVID-19 in most countries – including social lockdowns, and school and 
work closures – will mean the impacts of the crisis will extend far beyond economics. The physical 
health, mental well-being, education, and personal safety of children living in deprived conditions 
and disadvantaged settings is at risk.
In the simplest of terms, COVID-19 will affect children directly and indirectly in three ways: the impact 
of the virus itself, the impact of immediate responses to the virus (including lockdowns), and the 
economic repercussions of the crisis and the response measures.
The direct and indirect effects of the virus 
Some children will be directly affected by either contracting the disease or by being witness to others 
contracting it; some will experience the loss of one or more family members and will need support. 
Even without experiencing such a loss, the fear of the disease and the worry about its possible impact 
on family members can have a deep psychological impact on many children. 
The disease will also affect them indirectly in numerous ways. For example, the loss of a family 
member will place a strain on household income and resources. Children will experience deprivations 
and may also be expected to take on new responsibilities such as caring for others. This will affect 
their own activities and could, for example, damage their educational engagement and progress. The 
disease, and its burden on health systems, will also have impacts placing a strain on services for 
children. This may affect some children more severely than others – for example, children who have 
chronic health conditions may not receive the medical care that they need. 
The effects of measures taken in response to the virus 
Measures taken by governments to attempt to contain the spread of the disease will affect children in 
various ways beyond obvious economic ones. The experience of lockdowns will also affect them 
according to their developmental stage; younger children will experience restrictions in opportunities 
to play outside, adolescents may be particularly affected by loss of peer networks. Children of all 
ages may suffer the physical effects of reduced activity. These psychological and physical effects will 
be particularly pronounced in poorer households living in cramped conditions and lacking access to 
their own outside space. The shut-down of school systems will clearly affect children’s educational 
progress and this will inevitably affect children unequally. Children who live in households lacking 
resources – including material ones such as an internet connection, books and stationery, and human 
resources such as parents with the time, skills and educational background to support learning – will 
fare much worse than children in more privileged circumstances. 
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In households experiencing drug addictions, alcohol abuse, and/or interpersonal violence, children 
are at a greater risk of harm during lockdown than at other times. 
The economic repercussions of COVID-19
The economic repercussions of COVID-19 will inevitably have a major impact on children’s well-being, 
as was seen from the last global financial crisis (UNICEF, 2014). Resources will be squeezed at the 
national, regional, community, and household levels. Financial constraints and international markets, 
coupled with internal travel restrictions, will result in the economic stress of one country influencing 
conditions in other countries. For example, households that are dependent on remittances from 
family members abroad – as is the case in many ECA countries – may suffer substantial losses in 
income if those family members are unable to earn. Deprivation can lead to children’s physical health 
suffering through increases in malnutrition for example, and future opportunities become more 
constrained.
An ecological model of COVID-19 influences on child well-being
To inform and facilitate such action, systematically analysing the full range of mechanisms through 
which COVID-19 will impact children is vital to determining the best forms of social protection 
support for households with children, and to developing a suite of complementary services to meet 
the complex and acute needs described above. An ecological framework can conceptualise 
mechanisms through which COVID-19 will impact on children. 
UNICEF Innocenti has developed a framework to link macro-economic and social conditions to child 
well-being, based on a validated ecological model (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). The framework can help 
understanding of how factors related to COVID-19 at different levels – from families to broad societal 
contexts – affect children, often through a cascading sequence of effects (see Figure 1). The 
framework has the advantage of explaining and highlighting how COVID-19 can have unequal impacts 
on children living in the same societal conditions but with different community and family contexts 
and identifying mechanisms for reducing such inequalities.










e.g. GDP, jobs, air pollution
e.g. Health, education, social protection
e.g. Parental work-life balance, relationship
of parents with school, neighbourhood
e.g. Household resources, school resources
e.g. Parental stress, relationship with peers
e.g. Increased caring duties, exercise
e.g. Mental health, physical health, skills
Source: Rees & Gromada (2020). 
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Figure 1 illustrates the influences around a child in the universal context and recognises children as 
part of the society in which we all live – breathing the same air, clean or dirty, and living with the 
same policies and rules in the same system. Within these contexts, policies, social networks, 
resources, relationships, and activities in their various forms can mitigate or accentuate the benefits 
or risks experienced in context. 
The example of literacy achievement illustrates how connections between layers of the ecological 
model can combine to influence a child’s outcomes. School closures (policy) will impact children 
differently according to the material and human resources at home. Children who do not have access 
to the internet, books or a quiet place to study (resources), and who also lack parents with the time, 
skills and educational background to support learning (relationships), will fare worse than children 
whose home environment supports their educational progress. At the same time, the direct impact of 
the disease on families and the economic repercussions (contexts), may mean that children are 
expected to take on additional responsibilities at home (networks). This will reduce their time to 
spend on schoolwork (activities). Necessary interventions in cases such as school closure would 
therefore seek to address inequalities in resources at home as well as considering the facilitation of 
flexible work for parents and providing guidelines or supports for parents’ home-schooling 
strategies.2 
2.2 Evidence from the literature on crisis and children
As dependents, children and young people are often among the most vulnerable to the effects of 
crisis. In the case of COVID-19, vulnerability to health consequences is mostly with the elderly, but the 
social and economic effects will be felt by all. This section summarises key findings from a recent 
review of global evidence on the nature and direct and indirect effects of public policy responses to 
previous health and economic crises on families and children (Tirivayi et al, 2020). The review has 
covered health crisis, economic crisis and natural disasters for two reasons: to better understand the 
repercussions of both health and economic crisis in line with the COVID-19 experience; and to include 
learning from natural disasters which “were ‘rapid’ in onset, [with] wide-ranging geographical reach, 
and resulted in disruption of social services and economic sectors without affecting the governance 
systems” (ibid). 
The research summarises two streams of findings: a summary of the public policy responses in terms 
of social protection and economic stimulus, and the impacts and response to the crises on child and 
family outcomes.
A summary of economic stimulus and social protection responses in crisis contexts
The evidence from Tirivayi et al (2020) highlights the role of economic stimulus and social protection 
responses in various crisis contexts. While evidence on public policy responses to virus pandemics 
(apart from HIV/AIDS) is scant, documentation of policy responses to economic crises is extensive, 
particularly for the 2008 global financial crisis. Table 1 summarizes the key findings and evidence of 
various social protection responses, specifically cash transfers.
2 Dreesen et al. (2020).
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  Scant evidence of macro-economic 
policy responses, possibly because 
scale of economic impacts was not as 
large as COVID-19. 
  Public policy responses to previous 
pandemics has not directly addressed 
the needs of children.
  Social protection responses to 2013 
West Africa EVD outbreak were limited 
in coverage.
  Social protection responses to 2013 
Ebola outbreak included short-term 
non-statutory social assistance 
programmes e.g., cash transfers, in-
kind transfers, jobs, cash-plus skills 
training in Sierra Leone.
  Social protection responses to HIV/
AIDS pandemic target infected 
individuals, and those at risk of 
infection or vulnerable to the impacts 
(orphans and family members). They 
include cash and food transfers often 




  Initial short phase of expansionary 
fiscal and social protection responses 
followed by a longer phase of austerity 
measures. 
Initial Phase
  Economic stimulus packages 
widespread across regions: generally 
small in South East Asia, with larger 
packages in the US, and Europe (more 
in the US than in Europe).
  Pre-existing statutory social protection 
programmes or plans used for rapid 
response in HICs as well as South 
Asia and Latin America (legacy from 
previous regional financial crises). 
Fewer countries introduced new 
social protection schemes. Expansion 
in sub-Saharan Africa hampered by 
weak social protection systems, low 
pre-existing coverage and decreased 
revenues.
Second phase
  Austerity measures reduced public 
spending including funding of social 
protection measures. Initial social 
protection responses were phased out 
or terminated in developing countries.
  HICs and MICs provided pension 
reforms, unemployment benefits, 
active labour market policies, parental 
leave, social transfers, child benefits, 
school feeding and education 
subsidies, tax breaks for families.
  A few HICs and MICs extended 
coverage of unemployment benefits, 
pensions to informal workers e.g., 
USA, Germany, Japan, Argentina and 
Malaysia 
  Cash transfers were widely expanded 
in MICs; mostly in Asia and Latin 
America. 
  Reforms of CCTs in Latin America and 
the Caribbean included top-ups and 
buffers for crises. 
  Schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
mostly donor funded e.g., food or fuel 
subsidies, food cards, school feeding 
schemes, and public works.
  Gender-blind/discriminatory responses 
in some countries (e.g. in Sweden) 
were more favourable towards sectors 
dominated by men (e.g., heavy 
industries) or exclusion of young men 
in social assistance and unemployment 
benefits in the US.
3 To simplify and make ECA specific where possible.
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Crisis Responses Examples
Natural disasters   Both one-off and pre-existing social 
protection programmes used in crisis 
response. 
  Emergency cash transfers followed 
by transitions of beneficiaries to 
permanent statutory schemes (e.g., 
China).
  Inter-governmental agency 
competition and lack of collaboration, 
duplication, poor MIS and weak 
compliance monitoring, lack of 
community participation weakened 
post-disaster cash responses.
  Emergency cash transfers a popular 
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami 
and earthquakes. 
  Gender-sensitive programming 
included micro-credit programmes for 
women and engagement of women in 
relief and recovery processes as active 
agents.
  Drought responses often include cash 
transfers, micro-insurance and micro-
credit programme
 
Source: Tirivayi et al, 2020.
Macroeconomic and social protection responses have various impacts on children and families
In terms of children’s outcomes, the review has focussed on both direct and indirect effects (in line 
with the ecological model (see Table 1) to cover: economic security; health and health care services; 
children’s education; gender equality; family formation; and gender-based violence (Tirivayi, 2020: 2). 
The evidence showed that macroeconomic and social protection responses had various impacts on 
children and families, and the appropriateness of a policy response depended on the type of shock.
Table 2 summarizes the evidence on child and family outcomes related to public policy responses to 
crises. Results show that economic stimulus, cash transfers, and social services have direct positive 
effects on children, especially child health and health care utilization, school attendance, poverty 
reduction and child mortality reduction. Similarly, most social protection responses have indirect 
positive effects on children such as the protection of family income, adult unemployment, job 
retention, adult suicides, adult physical and mental health, food security, assets, agricultural 
productivity, livelihoods and psychosocial health. 
Austerity has direct negative effects on childcare and parental caregiving, while labour market 
programmes that target school-going children increase dropout, and cash transfers sometimes fail to 
improve child nutrition. Indirect negative effects include gender inequality from gender-biased 
economic stimulus packages; austerity-driven infectious disease outbreaks, homelessness, crime, 
poor mental health and suicides; long term unemployment from unemployment benefits; a reduction 
in school finances and quality of services from waivers; and elite capture in scholarships. 
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Table 2: The direct and indirect impacts of public policy responses to crises 
on children and families 
Public policy 
response








Gender inequality from favouring 
predominantly male sectors e.g., heavy 
industries
Austerity Reductions in childcare service coverage, 
parental caregiving (children given to care 
services)
Infectious disease outbreaks
Homelessness, crime, adult mental health, 
suicides
Health insurance Greater health care utilization by families
Unemployment 
benefits
Poverty reduction Increased job search by adults
Increases in long-term unemployment
No change in individual employment
Weather 
insurance
Increases in asset ownership and 
agricultural productivity
Cash transfers Poverty reduction
Increased school attendance, health care 
utilization
Mixed results in child nutritional status
Increases in food security, livelihoods, and 
psychosocial health
Modality matters: targeting, coverage, 
transfer value and duration
Food transfers Improved child nutrition Improved food security




Improved school attendance Reduction in school finances, quality of 
services
Increases in unequal access (elite capture)
School feeding Improved child nutrition, cognitive 




Increases in school dropout (if targeted to 
school-going children)
Increases in family income, adult 
employment, job retention, adult physical 
and mental health
Reduction in adult suicides
Social services Improvements in child mortality, and child 
education
Note: Tirivayi et al (2020) distinguish between the timelines of effects, by short- medium- and long-term outcomes.  
Source: Adapted from Tirivayi et al, 2020.
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2.3 COVID-19, Sustainable Development Goals, and children 
With 10 years to achieve the sustainable development goals4, a dual health and financial crisis puts 
recent gains in terms of child-focused indicators within this framework at risk of stalling or at worst, 
reversing. Key indicators that matter for children in this framework include poverty, nutrition, health, 
education, youth employment, and mental health and violence. This report deliberately selects key 
indicators from the SDG framework in order to highlight the importance of keeping these goals on 
track for children, whatever challenges the COVID-19 crisis brings. 
Table 3 below, outlines eight such indicators, all derived from the United Nations’ global SDG 
database. Each indicator has been selected to represent a goal in the SDG framework and to align to 
key concerns related to the COVID-19 crisis. For each child well-being measure, countries have been 
colour-coded, with orange representing higher performing countries on each of the indicators, 
relative to the group (at least half of a standard deviation above the unweighted group average), and 
blue denoting countries where performance is low relative to the group. Red shows the group of 
countries that are around the average for the ECA group. 
The proportion of the population living below the national poverty line is target 1.2.1 under Goal 1: 
End Poverty in all its forms. Early indications from the COVID-19 crisis finds that closure of schools 
and workplaces is severely restricting the earning capacity of millions of families, resulting in 
increased debt, payment arrears, lower levels of consumption, and/or the depreciation of savings and 
as such, poverty risks are expected to increase. The results for this indicator, based on the different 
methods for calculating national poverty rates, are reported relative to the 10-year average for each 
country. Scores above 1 show that poverty is on the increase relative to the last decade while scores 
below 1 show progress is being made. For instance, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have seen substantial 
falls in poverty in the past decade (see Figure 15), whereas the most recent data for the Russian 
Federation is reporting poverty risks around 10 per cent higher than average for the last 10 years.
Children under the age of five who are moderately or severely wasted (percentage) is Target 2.2.2 
under Goal 2 to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable 
agriculture. Linked to poverty and lack of nutrition, wasting is one way to indicate the most severe 
forms of deprivation experienced by children. As above with poverty, lockdowns of schools and care 
centres where many children can access food supports, together with the closure of workplaces upon 
which parents are reliant for employment, are likely to exacerbate rates of wasting among children. 
School feeding programmes in particular have been severely limited in coverage as the crisis hits. 
Unfortunately, recent data on wasting for all countries in ECA is hard to find; one third of countries 
have no data, or no data since 2012. The highest reported rates of wasting in ECA are in Bulgaria and 
Tajikistan where around 1 in 20 children are affected, and the lowest rates are seen in Albania and 
Georgia, where numbers are lower than 1 in 50 children.
There is no shortage of concern related to the delivery of health services during COVID-19. Specific-
ally regarding the high demand on health services from people with the virus and the resulting 
effects on shortages of PPE and other medical supplies required to treat COVID-19 and other 
illnesses. Moreover, the concern struggling healthcare systems are having in postponing preventative 
treatments, or non-essential interventions, while prioritizing COVID-19 caseloads, is likely to increase 
overall rates of morbidity and mortality. Finally, there is a risk that families seeking medical help will 
4  https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
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avoid clinics and hospitals for fear of contracting COVID-9, thus delaying necessary diagnoses and 
treatment and resulting in further health concerns. 
































































SDG targets 1.2.1 2.2.2 3.2.2 3.2.1 8.6.1 4.1.1 3.4.2 16.1.1
Albania FALSE 1.6 8.8 6.5 FALSE 47.8 FALSE FALSE
Armenia 0.84 4.4 12.4 6.5 36.6 FALSE 0.6 0.0
Azerbaijan FALSE 3.2 21.5 11.2 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Belarus 1.00 FALSE 3.4 1.3 FALSE 76.6 FALSE FALSE
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 0.96 2.3 5.8 4.1 21.2 46.3 2.1 0.0
Bulgaria 1.07 6.3 7.1 3.6 15.0 52.9 3.3 0.1
Croatia 0.97 FALSE 4.7 2.6 13.6 78.4 6.4 0.5
Estonia FALSE FALSE 2.6 1.2 9.9 88.9 8.7 0.0
Georgia 0.74 1.6 9.8 5.9 26.9 35.6 3.1 0.1
Kazakhstan 0.44 3.1 9.9 5.6 FALSE 35.8 13.5 0.3
Kyrgyzstan 0.79 2.0 18.9 13.2 20.5 FALSE 7.7 0.1
Latvia 1.03 FALSE 3.9 2.0 7.8 77.6 6.9 0.3
Moldova, 
Rep. of 0.51 1.9 15.8 11.9 27.8 57.0 6.8 0.5
Montenegro 0.98 2.8 2.5 1.7 16.2 55.6 FALSE FALSE
North 
Macedonia 0.93 1.8 9.9 7.4 24.1 44.9 2.8 0.0
Romania 1.00 FALSE 7.3 3.4 14.5 59.2 5.3 0.3
Russian 
Federation 1.06 FALSE 7.2 3.2 12.4 77.9 FALSE FALSE
Serbia 1.01 3.5 5.5 3.4 17.0 62.3 1.9 0.4
Tajikistan 0.96 5.6 34.8 15.0 FALSE FALSE 3.3 0.0
Turkey 0.86 1.7 10.6 5.5 24.4 73.9 2.3 0.2
Turkmenistan FALSE 4.2 45.8 21.0 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Ukraine 0.33 FALSE 8.7 5.2 16.5 74.1 FALSE FALSE
Uzbekistan FALSE 1.8 21.4 11.6 FALSE FALSE 14.9 0.2
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Note: Most recent data for all indicators is as follows: Population living below the national poverty line, 2017 except Bulgaria, Romania, 
Serbia (2016), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova ,Tajikistan (2015), and Latvia (2014); children 
under age five moderately or severely wasted, 2017 except Turkey (2018), Armenia, Georgia, North Macedonia (2016), Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan (2015), Bulgaria, Serbia (2014), Azerbaijan, Montenegro, (2013), and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova 
(2012); under-five mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births), 2018; neonatal (<1 month) mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births), 
2018; youth not in education, employment or training, 2018 except Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019), Armenia, Ukraine (2017), Russian 
Federation (2016), the Republic of Moldova (2015); children achieving a minimum proficiency level in reading (%), 2018; suicide rates, 
2016 except Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova and Romania (2017), Bulgaria, Georgia and Latvia (2015) and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2014) and North Macedonia (2013); homicide rates, 2016 except Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova and Romania (2017), Bulgaria, 
Georgia and Latvia (2015). Indicators are colour-coded to show countries half a standard deviation above or below the unweighted 
country average. Blue represents countries with reported ‘worse’ than average outcomes, countries with orange colour report ‘better’ 
than average outcomes. Categories will be used in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis in Section 4. 
Source: See Annex 1. 
Two indicators, the under-five mortality rate (3.2.1) and the neonatal mortality rate (Target 3.2.2) are 
reported under Goal 3 to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. The former 
indicator is likely to be sensitive to changes in primary healthcare and preventative treatments for 
pre-school children, including immunizations; the latter is more likely to be more sensitive to 
maternal health, hospital care and health system performance around the time of birth. Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Montenegro and Serbia are all relatively high performers in 
the ECA region across both measures. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan are in the lower-performing group for both measures. 
The proportion of youth aged 15 to 24 not in education, employment or training is target 8.6.1 under 
Goal 8, to promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all. The COVID-19 crisis has already served to shut schools and 
workplaces in the majority of countries in the region – with no clear plans for reopening at time of 
writing. Evidence from the GFC showed that in terms of employment, the crisis in Europe and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) disproportionately affected youth 
(Scarpetta, 2010). Unlike the GFC, which ‘only’ saw economic slowdown disproportionately affecting 
youth employment, COVID-19 has also led to the closure of academic centres, meaning that young 
people staying on in school or higher education may be less ready to pick up the slack of inactivity 
and unemployment than in previous crises. In ECA there are larger differences in the experiences of 
youth; in Estonia and Latvia fewer than 1 in 10 young people are NEET, whereas in Armenia it is 
slightly more than one in three. 
Children achieving a minimum proficiency level in reading (percentage) is target 4.1.1 in Goal 4, to 
ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. 
How school closures and differences in home learning conditions and availability of online learning 
will affect children’s reading and literature during COVID-19, both in terms of average rates and equity 
in outcomes, is yet to be seen. Results for this measure in ECA countries for 2018 show that around 
three in every five children of lower secondary school age have minimum reading proficiency, with 
the highest rates seen in Estonia, and the lowest rates seen in Georgia. 
Looking again to Goal 3 – ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages – suicide 
rates per 100,000 of the 15–19-year-old population is part of the reporting towards target 3.4.2. This 
measure is included to reflect the mental health concerns related to COVID-19 lockdown and the 
experience – for some children – of stress or grief related to illness and death within the family. 
Understanding additional social and economic pressures on this measure, and the approaches to 
COVID-19 that mitigate or accentuate these pressures may be important to achieving this goal in the 
next decade. According to the most recently available data by country, around 1 in 20,000 older 
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adolescents is a victim of suicide in the region, ranging from Armenia where the risk is around 10 
per cent of this average to Uzbekistan, where suicide risks are three times the ECA average.
The final child outcome indicator included in this report is the rate of intentional homicide in the 
zero to fourteen-year-old population, data included as part of reporting to SDG target 16.1.1. The 
inclusion of this indicator is to allow for a closer study of the social and economic pressures on 
violence against children that may be worsened during the COVID-19 crisis. Multiple reports of an 
increase in the incidence of domestic violence during social lockdown5 indicates a greater risk of 
children experiencing and/or witnessing violence. Although an imperfect measure of the prevalence 
of violence in all its forms, homicide data is more widely available. It is indicative of the severe 
consequences of violence against a person and is used to infer a failure of state prevention and 
intervention in acute cases. The highest rate of intentional homicide in the zero to 14-year-old 
population is seen in the most recently reported data for Croatia, Moldova, and Serbia – where one 
in 200,000 children is the victim of intentional homicide. The lowest rates are in Armenia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Tajikistan where no intentional homicides were reported 
in the most recent data. 
5  Provide examples here. NPR (2020) for instance. 
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3. COVID-19 AND KEY ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLICY CONDITIONS THAT MATTER 
FOR CHILDREN
Initial public policy responses by country have varied on the basis of existing governance, available 
information, and the extent to which the country has been affected by the virus. This section will 
therefore present: 1) a range of descriptions and statistics covering national contexts related to initial 
response (e.g., health care systems, governance); 2) a timeline for the emergence of new information 
(including the role of international organizations in providing information and other responses); and 
3) patterns of COVID-19 growth at the national level (building on the global timeline introduced 
above). 
This section will also present a selection of statistics related to national preconditions that increase or 
lessen the susceptibility to health, economic or social shocks (e.g., numbers of intergenerational 
households, rate of informal labour, rates of acute respiratory infections, growth rates and other 
economic conditions (government debts and current account deficits), poverty and other social 
statistics related to mental health, intimate partner violence, and so on. 
Data are presented for a selection of variable trends and other trend data where the majority of 
countries that reveal stable patterns over the last 12 to 14 years are not shown here but are available 
from the authors on request (See Annex 1, Table 1).
3.1 What economic preconditions matter for children? 
The wealth of a nation determines the extent to which it can provide for the needs of its population 
and specifically, the welfare of dependent groups such as the elderly and children. Wealth is 
represented by GDP per capita (see Figure 2) and mapped from two years before the GFC (2006) to 
the latest available data (the same timeline will follow in all trend comparisons). Per capita GDP 
growth indicates economic development, and in social protection for families and children, this can 
mean greater fiscal space for development of ‘investment-orientated’ social programmes. Either 
through inclusive growth or redistribution, GDP per capita growth is a foundation for poverty 
reduction. Contractions in per capita GDP can limit the fiscal space for public interventions while 
simultaneously increasing demand for them. This may result in austerity and specifically, greater 
restriction to benefit coverage, more stringent conditions on receipt, and a weakening of adequacy 
(Richardson, 2010).
Falls in GDP around the period of the GFC and again in 2014–5 are evident in wealthier countries of 
the region, and slight but noticeable in the lower-income group (see Figure 2). This maps to a time of 
a Russian financial crisis and a devaluation of the Ruble. The GFC led to contractions in growth, 
evident in the per capita measures and underlying population trends do not contribute to these 
fluctuations. Following the dip in 2009, all countries recovered to original trends, peaking between 
2013-14 before a second round of contraction. By 2018, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Turkey had not fully 
recovered from the 2015 dip, despite it being of a smaller magnitude to that seen in 2009. 
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Figure 2: Falls in per capita GDP are most evidence in the richer 
ECA countries in 2009 and 20156






































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by mid-year population. GDP is the 
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation 
of natural resources. Data is in current US dollars.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, World Bank, 2020.
 
Regrading periods of recovery, in both 2009 and 2015 there are examples of countries in the region 
where recovery was three to five years following the dip in GDP per capita. Among these countries 
are Armenia, Montenegro, Serbia and Romania and more notably, Croatia where small dips in per 
capita GDP in 2009 were followed by a stalling recovery – albeit a recovery – over the following 
10 years. 
Figure 3 looks behind the GDP per capita figures to map the growth rates in the economies of ECA 
countries from 2006 to 2018. Growth rates indicate an economy is in recession, and productivity, so 
more broadly, opportunities for earnings fall. With the exception of Azerbaijan (which in 2006 and 
2007 reports growth rates of 34.5 per cent and 25.5 per cent respectively), annual growth rates in the 
region have not exceeded 15 per cent in any given country. Likewise, in recent years, in all countries, 
6 Devaluation of the Rubel?
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they have not exceeded around 5 per cent. Recent stability in growth rates is a good sign for 
countries in the region as steady growth provides jobs and opportunities without risking a cycle of 
boom and bust. Notable in the picture is that around 2008 and 2009, most ECA countries saw 
significant downturns in economic growth, with contractions as high as 15 per cent. As with GDP per 
capita, a more minor dip is seen in growth rate trends around 2015. The contractions in Ukraine are 
notable and are likely to have been influenced by conflict there.
Figure 3: Most ECA countries saw GDP growth fall around 2009, 
with several in minus figures




































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. To read the downturns at a glance: the quickest short term or one-year recoveries can 
be seen to have a ‘V-shape’ (e.g., Armenia), medium-term or two-to three-year recoveries have a more distinguished ‘U-shape’ (e.g, 
Ukraine from 2013), and the slower, longer-term recovery, is best described as having an ‘L-shape’ (e.g., Serbia). Data for Azerbaijan in 
2006 and 2007 reports growth rates of 34.5 per cent and 25.5 per cent respectively; these are not included to allow the y-axis range to 
be readable across all charts. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices is based on constant local currency. Aggregates 
are based on constant 2010 US dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, World Bank, 2020.
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Concerning for some countries is the amount of time taken to recover to positive economic growth. 
Belarus, Croatia (most severely), Estonia, Latvia, and Romania, all spent two or more consecutive 
years in negative growth following the 2008 GFC. 
Both Figures 2 and 3 illustrate historic trends while Figure 4 provides an indication of how each sector 
– services, industry and agriculture – contribute to the gross domestic product in each country in 
order to assess future trends. Specifically, including this measure will help infer how various lock-
downs and closures might affect workforces. Work that requires manual labour, or a person to be 
physically at a factory or a farm, is likely to suffer more from lockdowns than work that can be 
undertaken at home. The size of the services sector will therefore give an indication of the extent to 
which work can continue through lockdown (if a similar proportion of this in each country can be 
undertaken remotely – excepting travel and tourism).
Results from Figure 4 show that most countries in the region rely on the service sector to generate 
50 per cent or more of wealth in the economy. However, industry continues to make significant 
contributions, particularly in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan is most reliant 
on productivity from agriculture, where forestry, hunting, fishing, and farming contribute equivalent 
value to both industry and the service sector. 
Figure 4: Services contribute half of the GDP in 17 of the ECA countries

































































































































Notes: Countries are ordered left to right by size of the value added by the service sector. Value added is the net output of a sector after 
adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. Services correspond to wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and 
restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate 
services. Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties. Industry includes mining, manufacturing, construction, 
electricity, water, and gas. Agriculture includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
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Of note is that four of the top seven countries in terms of value added by the service sector – Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Romania – are also countries that saw the most prolonged downturns in the 
region at the time of the GFC (see Figure 4).
Another economic factor relevant to the ECA region, certainly in terms of protecting livelihoods, is the 
receipt of remittances. Figure 5 maps the receipt of remittances in ECA countries per capita. Results 
show that the dips in remittance trends mirrors, in some countries, GDP per capita falls in 2009 and 
2015. In some countries, remittances were largely unaffected by economic downturns in 2008 and 
2015, which may be explained by the type of sectors in which earnings underlying remittances were 
made. 
Remittances as a proportion of GDP per capita in 2017 are reported in parentheses following country 
names (see Figure 5). In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remittances are received at rates equivalent to 
more than 30 per cent of GDP per capita. In Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the 
Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan remittances are equivalent to 10 per cent 
of GDP per capita. 
Several other indicators were collected to reflect the economic situation in ECA countries and may be 
included in the analysis in Sections 3 and 4. However, they are not presented and discussed due to 
limited data coverage for trends analysis across the group. Annex Table 1.3 provides the additional 
data on central government debt, net overseas development aid received per capita, and the balance 
of trade in ECA countries as a percentage of GDP for 2018. 
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Figure 5: Two dips in remittances are visible around 2009 and 2015, 
to varying extents
























2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Moldova (16.9%) Montenegro (10.8%) North Macedonia (2.8%)












2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Croatia (4.5%) Estonia (1.9%) Georgia (11%)












2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Tajikistan (31.3%) Turkey (0.1%) Turkmenistan (0%)
Ukraine (10.2%) Uzbekistan (12.1%)
Albania (10.1%) Armenia (13.3%) Azerbaijan (2.8%)
Belarus (2.3%) Bosnia and Herzegovina (11.2%) Bulgaria (3.8%)
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. Remittances include 1) personal and current transfers in cash or in kind between 
resident and non-resident individuals, independent of the source of income of the sender and the relationship between the house-
holds; and 2) compensation of employees which refers to the income of boarder, seasonal, and other short-term workers who are 
employed in an economy where they are not resident and of residents employed by non-resident entities. Compensation of employees 
represents gross earnings in cash and in-kind. 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
3.2 What social and demographic conditions matter for children? 
Complementing economic conditions, the social conditions of a nation will determine how prepared 
they are to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, and how interventions for responding might be designed. 
This section includes information about: income inequality; social protection expenditure; adequacy 
and coverage; employment statistics; rates of malnutrition; health expenditure; out-of-school 
populations and education expenditures; violence in the population (homicide rates); and the age-
distribution of the population itself. 
Figure 6 presents data on income inequality in the countries of ECA between 2006 and 2018 using the 
Gini index. Countries with higher levels of income inequality commonly have greater challenges in 
meeting the needs of the entire population with single universal interventions. Moreover, inequality is 
commonly found in parallel with higher rates of relative income poverty and related costs to 
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individuals and society. Inequality is a barrier to intergenerational mobility between income groups 
and as such, acts as a drag on social development. 
Across all the countries trends lie between a Gini Index of around 25 and just under 45. These are all 
below a threshold of high levels of inequality (50) and on occasion fall below the threshold for low 
levels of income inequality (30). The majority of countries show relatively consistent trends in in-
equality, with increases seen in the cases of Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria and Turkey, and falls seen in 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, North Macedonia, the Russian Federation, and most notably, the Republic of 
Moldova.
Figure 6: Income inequality in ECA is falling or stable in the majority of countries




























2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or in some cases, 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz 
curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest 
individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 
implies perfect inequality.
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
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Figure 7 reports the social expenditure in ECA countries, based on most recent available data. 
The social protection data includes data on unemployment benefits, pensions, social assistance 
payments, social insurance contributions, and benefits paid for the purpose of child raising. Across 
the region around 15 per cent of GDP on average is spent in social protection, ranging from just on 
8 per cent in Armenia to almost 23 per cent in Serbia. Total social protection expenditure indicates 
the fiscal space for existing interventions and to a lesser degree, the political economy for social 
protection response. Naturally, the level of expenditure in social protection also gives an indication 
of the strength of the social protection system and therefore, how well it is likely to mitigate shocks 
related to COVID-19.
Figure 7: Social protection spending in ECA countries accounts for 
approximately 15 per cent of GDP on average







































































































Note: for some countries, e.g., EU member states, disaggregated data is available through ESSPROS. 
Source: World Social Protection Report, 2017-2019.
 
What is notable is the aggregated nature of social protection expenditure and limited data availability 
(see Figure 8). The scarcity of data on social protection expenditure in ECA countries is replicated for 
data on the coverage of social transfers and the adequacy of cash transfers (see Annex Table 1.3). 
Again, the data on social transfer coverage and adequacy does not cover all countries and does not 
differentiate between benefits, which are directly delivered to families raising children or to children 
themselves. Instead, these data refer to all forms of social transfers, irrespective of the modality of 
payment, eligibility criteria, or rate of payment. More specific data on the types of social expenditures 
to different sociodemographic groups in the ECA region is needed to assess which types of social 
protection portfolios are most effective at meeting the needs of families with children. 
Figures 8 and 9 cover labour force participation and youth labour force participation to provide 
context on the potential impact of the lockdowns on family poverty and youth not in employment, 
education or training (NEET) rates. There is a great deal of consistency in labour force participation 
rates in the adult population between 2006 and 2018 in most countries (see Figure 8). The most 
notable fluctuations are visible in Albania and Moldova, and the most notable increase is seen in 
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Turkey. The highest rates of labour force participation in the region are in Latvia, at around 70 per 
cent of the total population aged 15 and older, and the lowest rates are in countries with rates 
consistently below 50 per cent, including Bosnia Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova, and 
Tajikistan. 
Efforts to collect data on informal labour were undertaken to compare with labour force participation 
rates. Data is only available for three countries: Armenia, 24.7 per cent; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 19.1 
per cent; and, Serbia 16.1 per cent (see Annex Table 1.3). Informal labour market participation results 
in workers being outside of official systems for social insurance, for the payment of taxes, and on 
occasion social assistance. High rates of informality, lower tax inflows, and social insurance contri-
butions at the aggregate level, mean the sustainability of fiscal stimulus and social protection related 
to the COVID-19 response will be diminished. Moreover, countries with lower income tax inflow rely 
more on consumption taxes and other forms of transaction taxes. At times of lower consumption, this 
type of tax inflow to fund public policies is also likely to be diminished. Finally, low rates of labour 
formality will mean social protection responses directed at official employment having lower 
coverage rates overall. Universal coverage is a prerequisite for the more progressive forms of social 
protection, particularly when the most vulnerable groups – such as people in informal and insecure 
employment – are outside the recipient group. 
31
Supporting Families and Children Beyond COVID-19:  Social protection in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Figure 8: Except in Turkey, ECA labour force participation rates are largely 
unchanged since 2006




































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Labour force participation rate is the proportion of the population aged 15 and older who are economically active – all people 
who supply labour for the production of goods and services during a specified period.7
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
 
What is notable from Figure 9, which maps the trends in youth labour force participation, is a lack 
of consistency in country trends. Moreover, labour force data for this age group has more gaps 
than data reported for the adult population. Trends in youth labour force participation in ECA 
countries does not consistently mirror growth trends or contraction around the 2008 GFC or the 
economic downturn in 2015, although in Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, the Republic of Moldova, and 
Serbia downturns in youth labour market participation were seen in 2009 or 2010. Similar 
downturns are not immediately evident in the adult population labour force participation trends 
(see Figure 8).
7 Eco, not health, crisis – informal labour. 
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Figure 9: In most countries of ECA, youth employment is stable 
or increasing modestly













































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. Employment-to-population ratio is the proportion of a country’s population who are 
employed. Employment is defined as persons of working age who, during a short reference period, were engaged in any activity to 
produce goods or provide services for pay or profit, whether at work during the reference period (i.e., who worked in a job for at least 
one hour) or not at work due to temporary absence from a job, or to working-time arrangements. Ages 15-24 years are generally 
considered the youth population.
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
 
Looking at malnutrition in the general population, there is a series of downward trends across most 
ECA countries in data from 2006 onwards (see Figure 10). Undernourishment is ‘the percentage of the 
population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements continuously’ (WDI, 
2020) and is one way to indicate the extent to which poverty in the population is translated into 
deprivation and poor nutrition. 
In recent years ECA countries’ trends in undernourishment have been converging. With rates falling 
from above 10 per cent of the total population, Albania, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have begun to 
catch up with the rest of the region. A number of countries such as Armenia, Georgia and Serbia, where 
undernourishment affects as many as one in 20, have seen no real gains in relative risk of being under-
nourished. In the remaining countries, fewer than one in 30 experience undernourishment, but no 
country is yet to fully eradicate this condition in their population. 
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Figure 10: Although undernutrition is falling in ECA countries, on average 
a few countries have seen increases





































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (also referred to as 
prevalence of undernourishment) shows the percentage of the population whose food intake is insufficient to meet dietary energy 
requirements continuously.
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
 
Similar to social protection expenditure (see Figure 10), public expenditure on health can be used to 
indicate the extent to which public systems are prepared to respond to health crises, and the health 
repercussions of economic crisis. Figure 11 reports trends in current health expenditure in per capita 
terms in sea countries since 2006. Across ECA countries, per capita health expenditure increased in 
real terms in the decade between 2006 and 2016. Expenditures have at least doubled in several 
countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. The most modest increases were observed in Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, and the Ukraine.
To complement the public investment in health services, families also regularly invest in health care 
needs from their own accounts. The level of out-of-pocket costs on health services is commonly 
considered to be a bigger barrier to accessing healthcare the higher the level becomes. Any 
disincentive to accessing healthcare services is a major concern as COVID-19 spreads. Out-of-pocket 
costs will be used to as a determinant in analysis of health outcomes for children in Sections 3 and 4 
with the most recent data presented in Annex Table 1.4. All countries have data for out-of-pocket 
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health expenditure, and trends in expenditure have been relatively consistent over time. In 2018, 
out-of-pocket health costs in ECA countries ranged from 15 per cent of total health expenditure in 
Croatia, to 81 per cent in Armenia. The average per person spend on out-of-pocket health costs in 
ECA countries is 45 per cent of total health care costs (World Development Indicators (WDI), 2020). 
Figure 11: Current health expenditure in per capita terms has increased 
in ECA countries since 2006




























2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. Health expenditure estimates have been prepared by the World Health Organization 
under the framework of the System of Health Accounts 2011. SHA 2011 tracks all health spending in a given country over a defined 
period of time, regardless of the entity or institution that financed and managed that spending. 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
 
Education is another important social condition to consider in times of health and economic crisis. 
Later in this report, education data will be used to study the effects of economic and social conditions 
on children’s reading proficiency; a key determinant of learning outcome is school attendance. Figure 
12 reports the proportion of adolescents of secondary school age in the region who are out of school. 
Aside from predicting literacy rates, knowing what proportion of children are out of school provides 
vital information for understanding the extent to which COVID-19-related school-based interventions 
will be able to address the needs of all children in a country.
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The results show a great deal of volatility across countries in out-of-school populations (see Figure 
12). In Azerbaijan since 2014 for instance, the number of adolescents out of school fell by 10 
percentage points over a four-year period. Similar success was seen in Bulgaria in the years leading 
up to 2013, however this was not sustained, and rates of out-of-school children returned to around 10 
per cent of total. An opposite pattern to Bulgaria is seen in Estonia, where the out-of-school pop-
ulation increased and then fell back to low levels. More consistent gains in school attendance can be 
seen in both Kyrgyzstan and Georgia. Remaining countries in the region have seen relatively stable 
patterns, except the Republic of Moldova and Turkey where, since 2006, rates of out-of-school 
children have doubled from 6 to 12 per cent, and from around 4 to around 8 per cent in each country 
respectively. 
Figure 12: Across ECA the trend changes in out-of-school adolescents are 
irregular, rising in some cases









































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
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Another social outcome trend in the analysis is intentional homicide rate in the population. This 
indicator is the focus of SDG 16, target 16.1.1. Homicide rates are introduced in this study to indicate 
the extent to which violence is experienced in each country, the extent to which the most extreme 
forms of physical violence are experienced in the region, and to understand whether violence of this 
form can predict experiences of violence in childhood. Moreover, this study will assess whether 
economic pressures brought on by the crisis, such as job loss, income poverty, and social isolation 
(e.g., due to stress, a lack of space, or an inability to escape immediate threats) imposed as response 
to the health crisis, might result in a spike in violence.
Results show that, with a few exceptions, there were declining trends of homicide rates in the total 
population in ECA countries (see Figure 13). Trend declines are stable, with the exception of Albania, 
Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser degree, Ukraine (this is likely to be partially explained by current conflict). 
For some countries, trend data on homicides in the population is sparse and needs updating. For 
instance, trends in Turkey and Tajikistan, and a single data point for Turkmenistan, all represent 
experiences prior to the start of SDG monitoring. 
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Figure 13: With a few exceptions, ECA countries are seeing a declining 
trend in homicide rates







































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia




Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Latvia
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a 
result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and 
predatory violence and killing by armed groups. 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
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The last set of data to be introduced in this section is demographic data and more specifically, 
population pyramids mapping the population in each country according to age and gender (charts, 
for reference, are in Annex 2 of this document). 
The population pyramids can be broadly categorized into three groups: 
  The first set have triangular shapes with large population bases around the preschool and 
primary school-age groups, tapering upwards in a fairly standard pattern to a point where the 
smallest population is aged 85 and over. Countries in this category include Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
  The second set display a more-rounded pyramid where the size of age cohorts diminishes more 
slowly as cohorts get older. This is seen in Turkey, giving the pyramid a round-edged look, with no 
irregularities in the population changes by age cohort. Similar round-edged shapes can be seen in 
countries such as Bosnian Herzegovina, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia (although the younger 
cohorts are less populated than the adolescent and the working-age cohorts, creating a bulge in the 
working population age groups). Rounder pyramids have fewer young dependents overall, relative 
to the more ‘triangular’ pyramids. 
  A third category may be described as ‘tree-shaped’, where from working age upwards, a triangle 
is formed as elderly cohorts are less populated, and below working age, where childhood and 
adolescence generally have smaller populations and their own pyramid shape. In these countries, 
a period of low fertility followed by recovery over the past two decades means higher dependency 
ratios, and challenges for welfare sustainability as the present workforce enters retirement. 
Countries with this shape include Azerbaijan, Belarus, Latvia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine.
 
A number of countries fall between two categories. Kazakhstan for instance has a very distinguished 
triangle shape with smaller populations in the adolescent years. Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
and Georgia have a rounded, smoothed population pyramid but also have attributes similar to 
irregularities of the ‘tree’ pattern. 
It is important to note that on a few occasions, gender differences are evident either side of the 
pyramid. For instance, among the older group in Croatia, Estonia, and Latvia, the population of 
females is much larger than that of males. This too is the case for the Russian Federation and the 
Ukraine, but differences in these countries are also evident starting from around age 55. Gender 
differences in pensionable age groups have consequences for poverty risks in households (including 
intergenerational households) where pensions rights have historically been built on social 
contributions related to employment – and mostly for men. 
Demographic data is important when assessing the public policy response to COVID-19. Such data 
informs the dependency ratios in a population, and therefore welfare affordability and sustainability. 
The population pyramids will therefore be referenced as part of the assessment and 
recommendations for social protection and public policy responses in Sections 5 and 6. Alongside 
this data, separate data has been collected on dependency ratios, and this series will be included in 
analyses.
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3.3 How have COVID-19 caseloads affected countries in Southern and Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia? 
Building on the economic and social background of countries in the ECA region, this section 
introduces evidence on COVID-19 caseloads by country and compares the onset of caseloads and 
deaths to approaches to the lockdown. These data are important for understanding the timing of the 
social and economic effects on families with children relative to the onset of the virus and its death 
toll. Together, these give an indication of: the extent of the time missing from the labour market and 
from school; the length of time families with children have been in physical isolation; and the severity 
of, and trends changes in, the virus caseload by country and how this might lead to longer or shorter 
lockdowns overall.
Figure 14 presents a series of timelines by country, mapping the onset of COVID-19 records, and 
overlays the timing of closure and decrees related to physical distancing/isolation (r), international 
travel (i), school closures (s), workplace closures (w), and the cessation of public events (p). Recovery 
rates are available from the same source but are not presented here. 
To read the charts, take for example Albania. The left-hand axis reports the daily counts of cases and 
deaths (running from 0 to 40), the right-hand axis reports the cumulative counts of cases and deaths 
from 30 January (the day the first response measure was implemented in the region – when the 
Russian Federation closed its borders to Chinese visitors) to 30 April inclusive (running from 0 to 
1,000). Total cases to the end of April are reported under the country name in each chart (773 cases, 
31 deaths). Both trend lines higher in the chart are counting cases, the lines lower in the chart both 
count deaths. For both cases and deaths, the lines for daily counts are more easily distinguished by 
their volatility and this is the same for all countries. On 9 March 2020, Albania implemented the full 
set of lockdowns and closures reported by these charts – these are flagged using the letters i, r, p, w, 
and s. 
To interpret the full set of results, countries with similar responses are reported in groups. The first 
set of groupings refers to the speed at which lockdown measures were implemented, and the manner 
in which they were coordinated. Of all of the countries, only Albania implemented a full set of 
measures, all on the same day (9 March). Montenegro and Armenia also implemented all measures 
on the same days – the 13 and 16 of March respectively – but both countries have not implemented 
workplace closures. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, and Ukraine implemented a full set of measures within a week. North 
Macedonia implemented all lockdowns in a week, but no evidence has been found to suggest either 
workplaces or public events have yet closed down. Uzbekistan implemented all lockdowns in eight 
days. In each country’s case, these lockdowns started in mid-March.
The remaining countries, with more than one decree in place, implemented lockdowns and closures 
in a different order over different periods of time. The earliest lockdowns were implemented by the 
Russian Federation (see above), Turkey on 6 February (banned entry to visitors from high-risk 
countries), and Romania, whereas from 11 February visitors from China have been required to 
quarantine for two weeks. In each of these countries the remaining decrees were implemented in 
March ranging from 10 days in Turkey (12 Mar [r] to 22 Mar [w]), to 23 days in Romania (8 Mar [p] to 31 
Mar [r,w]), and 25 days in the Russian Federation (5 Mar [r] to 30 Mar [w]).
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The remaining countries with multiple lockdowns – Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova and Serbia – actioned either four or five decrees in 
approximately 10 to 20 days. In all cases, school closures, public events, or international travel were 
the earliest interventions. Lockdowns and workplace closures were more commonly postponed. 
There are no examples in the countries with stepped closures where schools were closed last. 
So far, Tajikistan has implemented just one decree, on physical distancing and isolation on 15 March. 
Belarus had not implemented any decrees or lockdowns by the end of April. There is no data for 
Turkmenistan. 
Figure 14: Daily (left-axis) and cumulative (right-axis) deaths and caseloads 




























































All deaths (30/04): 31


























































All deaths (30/04): 32





























































All deaths (30/04): 24





















































All deaths (30/04): 89




























































All deaths (30/04): 69


























































All deaths (30/04): 66
All cases (30/04): 1506
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Figure 14: Daily (left-axis) and cumulative (right-axis) deaths and caseloads 






























































All deaths (30/04): 69


























































All deaths (30/04): 52





























































All deaths (30/04): 6





























































All deaths (30/04): 25



























































All deaths (30/04): 8






























































All deaths (30/04): 15




























































All deaths (30/04): 116


























































All deaths (30/04): 7



























































All deaths (30/04): 77




























































All deaths (30/04): 717
All cases (30/04): 12240
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Figure 14: Daily (left-axis) and cumulative (right-axis) deaths and caseloads 





























































All deaths (30/04): 1073





























































All deaths (30/04): 179























































All deaths (30/04): 0




























































All deaths (30/04): 3174




























































All deaths (30/04): 261




























































All deaths (30/04): 9
All cases (30/04): 2039
 
Note: There is no data for Turkmenistan. Data for Serbia was unreported between 21 April and 29 April – data for 30 April has been 
smoothed. Key: ‘i’ = international travel ban, ‘r’ = restrictions on personal movement (lockdown), ‘w’ = workplace closures, ‘s’ = school 
closures, ‘p’ = ban on public events. 
Source: Johns Hopkins, 2020 (COVID-19 data); Oxford University Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, 2020 (closures). 
 
The second way to review the country groupings by COVID-19 caseloads and responses is by looking 
at the shape and onset of caseloads of COVID-19 and the deaths, relative to the implementation of 
social decrees. 
A number of countries seem to be reporting declining daily caseloads over time. These include 
Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and 
Uzbekistan. In most of these countries, except for Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the beginnings of a 
‘flattening’ of the curve in the cumulative caseloads is visible. Among this group of countries only 
Georgia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro have not closed workplaces. North Macedonia has also 
not banned public events. In most cases, the timing of the closures is closely clustered around 
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mid-March, however Estonia and Georgia have larger gaps and responded with later closures after 
caseloads had begun to noticeably increase. 
In contrast, another group of countries reported the highest daily caseload around 30 April, including 
Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. High daily 
caseloads reported at the end of April would suggest that these countries are yet to reach the peak of 
the COVID-19 health crisis. In regard to the timing of closures for this group of countries, workplaces 
were closed as late as 30 March, or were not closed, with the exception of Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Ukraine where, despite closure patterns similar to most countries, caseloads are still on the rise. 
The two countries with the highest caseloads and deaths are among the most populous countries in 
the region: Turkey and the Russian Federation, where cumulative caseloads in both countries 
exceeded the 1 million mark by 30 April. Deaths in these countries are higher than 3,000 and 1,000 
respectively by end April, and have since continued to climb. The countries with the lowest caseloads 
in the region are Montenegro and Georgia, in these countries total deaths are 6 and 7 and caseloads 
are around 300 and 500 respectively. 
Tajikistan is a unique case, with just 15 reported infections identified by the end of April, no deaths 
reported, and one social decree. Belarus, where no social decrees of any form were reported by 30 
April, in contrast to Azerbaijan (a country of a similar population size – around 9.5 million) is reporting 
caseloads 7 times higher, with the cumulative caseloads displaying a steeper upward trend. 
3.4 Public policy response to COVID-19 in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
What has been the response of governments to the COVID-19 crisis in ECA countries? Tables 3 and 4 
map the social protection and fiscal stimulus responses in the 23 countries. Each table describes: the 
type of social protection policy or fiscal stimulus; the individuals or recipients of the intervention; the 
coverage in terms of numbers of recipients (social protection only); the payment details and costs 
related to the intervention; whether the intervention is national or universal in scope; and the length 
of time over which it will be implemented. 
Tables 4 and 5 are for reference, primarily in the sections that assess these responses; for this reason 
they will not be detailed in the text beyond a few headline facts.
From Table 4, in terms of social protection, by 28 April: 
  Sixty-one policies have been implemented in the ECA region, 23 of these built upon existing social 
protection systems, the remainder new. Armenia (9), the Russian Federation (7) and Turkey (5) are 
the most active countries in the region in terms of social protection reforms. Evidence of reforms in 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Latvia and the Republic of Moldova have not been found. 
  Whether a reform has insurance contribution conditions, has work incentives or conditions, or 
is provided by the state, and whether it is built upon an existing social protection policy or not, 
will determine its coverage, effect, administration cost and sustainability (or chances of being 
formalized). Amongst the benefits, 42 are social assistance benefits, available without insurance 
conditions and paid through tax revenues. Only 14 of these are expansions of existing programmes. 
Eleven social protection reforms are social insurance benefits, eight of which are expansions of 
existing programmes. Eight policies are labour market-related, with only one – in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – being an extension of an existing programme. 
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  Of all the reforms covered in Table 4, only one is a permanent reform – expansion of an existing 
social assistance cash transfer in North Macedonia. Forty-one are temporary measures, and 14 are 
one-off payments, a number of which are food parcels. Five reforms have no information on this 
condition. 
  Fifty-six of the reforms are national reforms, covering the whole country in each case. Five reforms 
are local, three of which are in the Russian Federation – the abolition of capital renew contributions 
(SA), a utility waiver (SA), and unemployment benefits (SI) – in each case a short-term temporary 
measure. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kyrgyzstan also have local reforms in place. 
  Where data on the numbers of recipients are available – 13 cases in total – the largest and smallest 
reforms in terms of coverage are both family cash benefits; in the Russian Federation (2 million 
cases) and Armenia (20,000 families registered in the family benefit programmes but not were not 
yet receiving).
  By the end of April, 11 of the 63 COVID-related social protection benefits were explicitly defined as 
family and child benefits, three of which are focusing specifically on the maternity and pre-school 
period. These early-year benefits included one in Armenia and two in the Russia Federation. In May, 
the Russian Federation also introduced a childcare policy (Gentilini et al, 2020). 
  Regarding global costs, the Russian Federation’s COVID-19-related family allowance payment has 
the highest total costs, at 105 billion in national currency units (NCU). At the other end of the scale, 
the localized benefit for low-income elderly in Bosnia and Herzegovina will cost around US$250,000. 
Data is available in only 18 cases, which limits an assessment of the effect on government debt and 
inferences about the need for future austerity. 
  The size of cash transfer, or the type of service delivered, is available for most reforms (39 in total). 
Among the one-off cash payments, the largest are seen in Armenia (around US$200), in support of 
children under 14, pregnant women, and private sector employees. The lowest one-off payment of 
US$35 is in Turkmenistan for the low-income elderly. 
  Information was sought on the duration of temporary benefits. Twenty-one of 41 countries have 
data, with the shortest being one month (Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Montenegro) and the longest 
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Table 4: Social protection responses to COVID-19 in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Policy type: Social 
Assistance (SA) Social 
insurance (SI), Labour 
Market policy (LM); 
Expansion of pre-
existing policy (Y/N)
Who is eligible? Coverage 
(persons)
Payment details Global cost 
in NCU / 
EUR / USD 











Albania Cash transfers, (SA), (Y). Recipients of Ndihma 
Economike 
2 X Amount Ndihma 
Economike N T
Cash transfers (new), 
(SA), (N).
Self-employed State-set monthly salary N T
Unemployment benefit, 
(SI), (Y).




Most vulnerable 2bln NCU/ 
17.5USD N O
Armenia Cash transfers, (SA), (Y). Households registered 
in family benefit 
programme (but not 
receiving it)
20k 60mln US N T 3
Cash transfers (new), 
(SA), (N).
Laid off / mandatory 
leave employees 70k N T
Cash transfers, (SA), (N). Households with 




Cash transfers, (SA), (N). Employees in formal 
sectors released from 
work (earning 
<1000US$)
Monthly minimum wage N T
Cash transfers, (SA), (N). Pregnant women with 
husbands who have lost 
their jobs
201 USD Lump sum N O
Cash transfers, (SA), (N). Private sector 





Between one and three 
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Policy type: Social 
Assistance (SA) Social 
insurance (SI), Labour 
Market policy (LM); 
Expansion of pre-
existing policy (Y/N)
Who is eligible? Coverage 
(persons)
Payment details Global cost 
in NCU / 
EUR / USD 
















and people with 
disabilities)
90k









Delayed utility payments N T
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Cash transfer, (SA), (N). Low income and elderly 250k USD L T
Unemployment benefits, 
(SI), (Y).
 5.5mln EUR N T 12
Activation (training) 
measures, (LM), (Y).
 33mln EUR N T 12
Bulgaria In-kind food/voucher 
scheme, (SA), (Y).
Elderly, disabled, poor 50k Individual food packages and hot meals N O
Unemployment benefits, 
(SI), (Y).
Employees from sectors 
hit by COVI-19 crisis 60% of previous income N T 1
Pensions / disability 
pensions, (SI), (Y).
Pensioners/ Disability 
pensioners 258k / 75k
Pensions recalculated / 
Renewed Certificates N T
Wage Subsidies, (LM), 
(N).
Workers 60% of wage 1bln NCU, (0.012) N T
Croatia Wage subsides, (LM), 
(N).
Workers 400k up to 4,000 NCU N T 3
Health and Pension, 
(LM), (N).
Workers 400k up to 1,460 NCU N T
Estonia Wage Subsidies, (LM), 
(N).
Workers without work / 
wage cut
70% of Average wage 
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Policy type: Social 
Assistance (SA) Social 
insurance (SI), Labour 
Market policy (LM); 
Expansion of pre-
existing policy (Y/N)
Who is eligible? Coverage 
(persons)
Payment details Global cost 
in NCU / 
EUR / USD 
















Large Support package: 
Subsidize utility fees
3bln NCU, 
(0.04) N T 3




All citizens Large Support package: 
Subsidy for out of 






Formal wage workers 
laid off N T
Kazakhstan Cash transfers (new), 
(SA), (N).
Formal wage workers 
laid off 1,5mln 100 USD N O 1
In-kind food/vouchers 
schemes, (SA), (N).
Large families with 
children, persons with 
disability and other 
vulnerable
N T 1
Pensions / social 
benefits (IMF), (SA), (N).
Pensioners/ disability 
pensioners
+10% increase in 
pension amount N T
Kyrgyzstan In-kind food/vouchers, 
(SA), (N).
Low-income families 
with children, children 
and adults with 
disabilities









Cash Transfer to 
persons with disabilities
1-year extension 
previous CT N T 12
Montenegro Cash transfer, (SA), (N). Low-income pensioners 50 € 1mln EUR N O 1
Wage increase, (LM), 
(N).
Healthcare workers 15% increase of wages 500k EUR N O 1
North 
Macedonia
Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Unemployed and 
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Policy type: Social 
Assistance (SA) Social 
insurance (SI), Labour 
Market policy (LM); 
Expansion of pre-
existing policy (Y/N)
Who is eligible? Coverage 
(persons)
Payment details Global cost 
in NCU / 
EUR / USD 











Romania Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Delivery adaptation N
Cash transfer, (SA), (N). Self-employed US$ 1,180 (0.02) N T
Unemployment benefits, 
(SI), (N).
Employees US$ 1,180 N T
Paid sick leave, (SI), (N). Parents of children 





Citizens aged 60 and 
above 40k N
Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Families with children 
aged 3-7 with income 
below subsistence level
2mln 105bln NCU N T
Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Maternity grants for 
families
US$ 63 (per each child 
under 3yrs) N T 3
Social pensions, (SA), 
(Y).
Abolition of capital 
renew contributions L T 3
Utility waiver, (SA), (Y). Extension of transport 
cards L T 1
Unemployment benefits, 
(SI), (Y).
Unemployed people US$ 250 L T 6
Paid sick leave, (SI), (Y). Quarantined citizens US$ 152 N T 4
Serbia Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Extension of 
beneficiaries to cash 
transfer
N T 3
Cash transfer, (SA), (N). 18+ years of age 100 EUR 70bln NCU N O
Pensions, (SI), (N). All pensioners 35 EUR 7bln NCU N O
Tajikistan Cash transfer, (SA), (N). Vertical expansion for 
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Policy type: Social 
Assistance (SA) Social 
insurance (SI), Labour 
Market policy (LM); 
Expansion of pre-
existing policy (Y/N)
Who is eligible? Coverage 
(persons)
Payment details Global cost 
in NCU / 
EUR / USD 











Turkey Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Low-income families 306mln 
USD N T
Cash transfer, (SA), (N). Workers affected by 




65+yrs with chronic 
conditions N T
In-kind support, (SA), 
(N).





Pensions, (SI), (Y). Minimum pension 
increased US$ 230 N
Turkmenistan Cash transfer, (SA), (N). Seniors with low income US$ 35 N O
Ukraine Cash transfer, (SA), (N). Children with disability N O
Uzbekistan Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Horizontal expansion of 
cash transfer 60k N
Public works, (SA), (Y). Expansion of PWP 21mln USD N
Cash transfer, (SA), (Y). Vertical expansion for 
low-income families 60mln USD N T 6
 
Note: No data for Azerbaijan, Belarus, Latvia, and the Republic of Moldova. 
Source: Gentilini et al. (2020), IMF (2020), UNESCO (2020). 
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From Table 5, in terms of fiscal stimulus, by 28 April:
  Forty-eight fiscal stimulus policies were reported by ECA countries. Fifteen cases involved delayed 
payments or exemptions of tax payments (Croatia implemented both), social security contributions, 
or import duty exemptions of medical supplies (the Russian Federation, Ukraine). Thirteen cases 
of stimulus in the form of facilitating credit lines to businesses are seen; Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Kazakhstan extend credit lines to individuals also. Thirteen cases of wage subsidies are noted – in 
Albania and Armenia, more than one form of wage subsidy is in action. Seven are general stimulus/
business supports, detail on the exact modalities not being clear in all cases although these can be 
restricted to sectors affected by COVID-19, or other sectors such as agriculture in Latvia. 
  There is no available information on fiscal stimulus packages in five countries: Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, 
the Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. For countries with data, all but three – 
Azerbaijan, Romania, and Uzbekistan – are employing more than one stimulus policy. 
  In the 34 cases where data is available, 25 of the fiscal stimulus policies are universal in coverage, 
with the remainder being sector specific. Agriculture (Estonia, Latvia), tourism (Georgia) and COVID-
19-affected sectors (Montenegro, North Macedonia, and the Russian Federation) are all subject to 
direct stimulus packages. 
  The global cost of stimulus packages is commonly in the billions and as such, dwarfs the costs of 
social protection interventions and in some cases, reaching costs equivalent to 3 and 6 per cent of 
GDP (Kazakhstan, Latvia).8 
  Time constraints on fiscal stimulus plans are less clear than for social protection policies and are 
missing for 38 of the 48 policies. The shortest stimulus plan is set for a month (wages subsidies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), the longest plan is set for three years (tax exemptions in Latvia).
8 Need to standardize all global costs in terms of GDP.
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Table 5: Fiscal stimuli in response to COVID-19 in Southern and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia 




Who is eligible 
(numbers 
covered)?
Payment details How much does 














Wage subsidy Firms Support for wage 
payments
11bln NCU U 3
Armenia Wage subsidy Firms Support for wage 
payments
30mln USD   
Wage subsidy Workers Minimum wage 68k NCU U
Credit lines Firms Subsidized 
govt-sponsored 
loans
400mln USD   
















Workers (40k) Delayed tax 
payment
50mln NCU S 3






1bln NCU U  
Bulgaria Credit lines Workers on 
unpaid leave
Up to 760 EUR 200mln NCU U
Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Corporate tax 
payment deferred
 U 4
Croatia Credit lines Workers U
Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Tax Delay  U  
Waivers and 
exemptions
Workers (400k) Tax exemption, 
those 
experiencing a 




Supporting Families and Children Beyond COVID-19:  Social protection in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia




Who is eligible 
(numbers 
covered)?
Payment details How much does 







Estonia Wage subsidy Workers Support to 
unemployment 
insurance fund 
support, to cover 
for wage 
reduction
250mln EUR U  
Credit lines Rural companies Business loans 200mln EUR S
Credit lines Individuals/firms Guarantees/
collateral for bank 
loans
1bln EUR U  




Georgia Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Property and 
income tax delay; 
interest subsidy, 
3bln NCU S (Tourism) 9
Waivers and 
exemptions








2.3bln USD   





Economy-wide 4.2bln USD 
(2.9%)
  
Latvia Wage subsidy Workers 75% of wage up 
to 700 EUR
2bln EUR (6.0%) U
Waivers and 
exemptions









Montenegro Wage subsidy Firms 70% of minimum 
wage
















(0.2%) S (COVID 
affected)
 
Wage subsidy Workers Economy-wide 
support
(1.0%)
Romania Credit lines Firms Loan guarantee 10bln NCU (1.0%) U  
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Who is eligible 
(numbers 
covered)?
Payment details How much does 









Wage subsidy Workers Wage increases 
for healthcare 
workers
Credit lines Firms Interest rate 
subsidies for 
SMEs
 U  
Waivers and 
exemptions







 U  
Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Deferrals of SMEs 










 U  
Credit lines Firms Loan guarantee S (COVID-
19-affected)
Serbia Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Deferrals of 
labour taxes and 
SSC contribution
140bln NCU U 3
Wage subsidy Workers 93bln NCU U 3
Turkey Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Postponement for 




















Ukraine Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Import duties 
exempted for 
medicines
Credit lines Firms Credit guarantee    
Uzbekistan Waivers and 
exemptions
Firms Interest subsidy 
and reduction in 
SSC
   
Source: Gentilini et al., (2020), IMF (2020), UNESCO (2020). 
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4. MAKING SENSE OF MANY FACTORS: LINKING THE EVIDENCE TO UNDERSTAND 
THE EFFECTS ON CHILDREN
In order to make sense of the multiple and complex factors of a health epidemic, social lockdown 
and the potential for a major economic crisis, this section of the report undertakes two types of 
empirical analyses. The first set of tests seeks to understand which categories of countries, by key 
determinants of child poverty and wellbeing, are more likely to be at risk of better or worse child 
well-being outcomes. This will allow countries in the region to understand how the ‘pre-COVID-19’ 
baseline results – reported in Table 3 – are aligned to key social and economic determinants such as 
GDP per capita or health expenditure and therefore, help predict their vulnerability to poorer 
outcomes following COVID-19. The second set of empirical tests estimates the elasticity of child 
poverty and well-being indicators according to changes in key social and economic determinants 
using pooled series data. This set of tests will provide more details on how the indicators themselves 
will change on average across countries in response to COVID-19. 
Together the two tests will allow countries to identify then predict and track changes to key economic 
and social determinants, based on priority areas (national vulnerabilities) and the sensitivity of child 
poverty and well-being outcomes to COVID-19 in the ECA region. Country-specific findings from 
these tests are the refence point to which the suitability of response to COVID-19 in each country is to 
be assessed. 
4.1 Predictors of child well-being before the COVID-19 crisis in Southern and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia
This section of the report is divided into seven subsections, each of which looks at one of the indicators 
of child well-being presented and rationalized in Section 2. Specifically, it uses a novel methodological 
approach – the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and its fuzzy-set technique – to identify the 
‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ economic and social conditions at the country level that explain the risk of 
better or worse outcomes on each of the child poverty and well-being indicators. This is the first time 
QCA methodology is being employed to look at the configurational logic of selected conditions to 
explain multiple child well-being outcomes in countries of Southern and Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia. The fuzzy-set QCA revolves around the concept of subset relations and presents the findings in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and their configurational interlinkages (Cebotari and Vink, 
2013). Based on the logic of sub-set relations, the status of being a necessary condition implies that the 
score in the outcome (Yi) is consistently lower to the score of the condition (Xi) in the pool of cases (i.e., 
Yi is a subset of Xi). Subsequently, the status of being a sufficient condition implies that the score of the 
condition (Xi) is lower than the score in the outcome (Yi) among cases in the sample (i.e., the Xi is a 
subset of Yi). For a detailed description of the QCA methodology see Annex 3 of this document.
Before going on to analyse each indicator in turn, Table 6 lists the selected child poverty and well-
being indicators alongside: indicators of economic context; employment; social context; service 
coverage; public expenditure; and household expenditure determinants. The conditions are selected 
based on alignment to the outcomes at hand and availability of most recent data. They will be used to 
assess the extent to which these outcomes are the result of economic and social factors, and how the 
indicators of child poverty and vulnerability might be expected to react to the COVID-19 crisis. Each of 
the conditions and outcomes has been presented and discussed in the section above. Where the 
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Table 6: Selected conditions by child-focussed SDGs: Economic, social and public policy contexts 
 Economic context Employ-
ment
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Note: Labour force participation rate is a modelled International Labour Organization estimate. Conditions in italics had insufficient observations to be included in the analysis. Most 
recent data used in the QCA models are reported in Annex Table 1.4.
Source: Annex Table 1.1.
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4.1.1 National poverty rates
The first set of results of the QCA are for poverty; specifically, the poverty risk in the population 
relative to the 10-year average (using the national poverty lines). Due to the lack of comparative data 
available for the ECA countries, the national poverty rate measures have been normalized. The results 
presented are a ratio of the poverty rate in a given year as a ratio of the average poverty rate in that 
country as recorded in the last decade. Countries reporting poverty ratios below 1 are reporting a fall 
in national poverty rates according to national measures. Countries reporting scores above 1 are 
reporting poverty rates on the increase (see Figure 15). 
Figure 15: On-average national poverty rates in ECA countries were falling 
prior to the crisis

















































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Moldova Montenegro North Macedonia
Romania Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic (no data) Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan (no data)
Ukraine Uzbekistan 
Notes: Results for each country report a ratio of the national poverty rate, in a given year, over the average for the period 2006 to 2017. 
Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no markers, 
no data for that country was reported. Data for Kazakhstan in 2006 was 2.7 – removed for readability of the charts.
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2020.
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The conditions analysed as part of the QCA are reported in Table 6 and include measures of 
inequality, wealth, personal remittances, employment, and public social protection expenditure.
For the analysis, countries were split into three groups: those with poverty rates 10 per cent higher 
than the decade average; those with poverty rates around the average; and countries with poverty 
rates 10 per cent lower than the 10-year average. These groups were then compared with country 
groupings for the conditions above (for details of group membership and grouping methods see 
Table 3 for outcomes and Annex Table 1.4 for determinants).
The results show there is one condition to meet criteria for higher levels of poverty in most ECA 
countries – a higher Gini index (more inequality), with a consistency score of 0.85.9 There are two 
outliers in this test – Belarus and Croatia – where both countries have comparatively higher scores in 
poverty rates than scores in the Gini index and thus, the Gini Index condition does not apply in their 
case. Yet, because neither of these countries are ‘extreme’ outliers, higher inequality in ECA can be 
considered as quasi-necessary for higher poverty rates. 
Moreover, in the ECA countries, higher levels of GDP tend to fit within the status of necessity when 
explaining higher poverty (in QCA this measure has a relatively high consistency score of 0.83). 
Again, there are outliers, and therefore, also indicative of poverty risks in the region, it is not a 
necessary condition – rather a sufficient indicator of risk. Notwithstanding, the result may reflect that 
with increased wealth, there is also increased poverty in the country, a process that may also include 
an unequal distribution of wealth in society. Policy responses aimed at mitigating the effects of 
inequality, for example through investments in education, more progressive taxation, and increasing 
the minimum wage, may also trigger changes in poverty rates in the region.
The reverse analysis seeking to assess necessary conditions for countries with lower levels of 
poverty resulted in no necessary conditions, meaning none of the conditions – high or low Gini, high 
or low levels of remittances, high or low GDP, and so on – were consistent (at 0.80 or higher) with the 
logic of being a necessary condition for lower poverty rates. 
Turning to the analysis of sufficient conditions, which describe the configuration of conditions that 
lead to higher or lower poverty risks, two paths are sufficient to explain higher poverty in the pool of 
countries: 
  Higher employment, higher GDP, and higher inequality (the Russian Federation, Latvia); or 
  Higher social protection expenditure, lower remittances, higher GDP, and higher inequality (Bulgaria). 
 
The consistency score of the formula encompassing both paths is 0.89, which indicates that the 
status of sufficiency is largely supported by empirical evidence. For each configuration of sufficient 
conditions a coverage score is also produced, in this case it is 0.64, which indicates that both 
combinations of sufficient conditions explain 64 per cent of the country cases higher poverty rates 
are reported. 
9 A consistency score approximates the alignment of subsets, with higher scores reflecting greater alignment between subsets (e.g. 
the high poverty rates group being closely aligned to the high Gini Index group). Higher consistency values are used to assess 
the status of a condition (high or low grouping on an indicator) as being necessary or sufficient condition in the pool of cases 
for explain an outcome. A consistency score of 0.80 is generally seen as the minimum accepted value for determining sufficient 
conditions in combination. For the identification in this analysis of singular necessary condition, a minimum accepted consistency 
threshold is 0.80 (see Annex 3).
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The configuration of conditions leading to higher poverty rates applies to the national contexts 
mentioned in the solution in that each context is specific in the way higher poverty is embedded in 
the configuration of sufficient conditions. For instance, in countries such as the Russian Federation 
and Latvia, high poverty rates exist despite a relatively high GDP, high employment rates, and higher 
inequality.
For better poverty conditions (lower rates of poverty relative to the 10-year average), three paths of 
conditions are sufficient to explain this outcome in ECA countries: 
  Lower labour force and lower Gini (the Republic of Moldova, Croatia, Ukraine and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina); 
  Low total social protection expenditure and lower GDP (Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, North 
Macedonia, Tajikistan); 
  Higher GDP and more equality (Croatia, Kazakhstan). 
 
With a consistency score of 0.97 and a coverage score of 0.71, these conditions together are sufficient 
to explain more than 70 per cent of the low poverty grouping in countries with data. It should be 
cautioned at this point that although these combinations of conditions were found to be sufficient for 
predicting poverty risks in the ECA countries using most recent data, other combinations of sufficient 
conditions may also exist.
One path of sufficient conditions shows that limited social protection spending in poorer countries 
may lead to reduced poverty rates, as is the case in the Republic of Moldova, Croatia, Ukraine, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This path of sufficiency appeals to efficiency of social protection spending 
in poorer settings. 
Another path of sufficient conditions shows that more equal wealth distribution can have efficiency 
gains in poverty reduction, even in labour markets with lower participation rates, as is the case in 
countries such as the Republic of Moldova, Croatia, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4.1.2 Children under the of age five who are moderately or severely wasted (per cent)
The second set of results show which countries are more at risk of increases in moderate and severe 
wasting in the under-five-years-old population. Figure 16 maps the available data by countries in 
trends and shows that child-specific information on nutrition in the region is scarce and where more 
than one point of data is available, the results are mixed.
The conditions analysed as part of the QCA are reported in Table 6 and include: measures of 
inequality; wealth; nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people); out-of-pocket health expenditure; current 
total health expenditure per person; and undernourishment in the population. For the analysis, 
countries were split into three groups by relative risk of wasting, as colour-coded in Table 1. 
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Figure 16: Data on wasting in children under five years is scant 
and progress is mixed
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Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Montenegro North Macedonia
Russian Federation (nd) Serbia
Croatia (no data) Estonia (no data) Georgia 





Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. 
Source: UNStats, SDG indicators (2020)
 
There are no necessary conditions to fulfil the criteria for higher and lower rates of wasting in ECA 
countries. The closest that comes to a necessary condition for higher rates of wasting is lower 
undernourishment in the population, with a consistency score of 0.64 (it needs to be a minimum of 0.80).
Based on the analysis of sufficient conditions, three paths are sufficient to explain higher wasting in 
the pool of countries: 
  More out-of-pocket health expenditure and more health expenditure (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan);
  Higher inequality, more nurses, and more health expenditure (Serbia);
  More nurses, less out-of-pocket health expenditure, and less expenditure on health (Kazakhstan).
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The consistency score of the formula encompassing the three paths is 0.75, indicating that the status 
of sufficiency is largely supported by empirical evidence. The coverage score of 0.64 indicates that 
the combination of conditions explains roughly 64 per cent of the country cases where higher rates of 
wasting are present. 
The finding that more out-of-pocket and health expenditure are sufficient conditions explaining 
higher wasting in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan may relate to the efficiency and coverage of the health 
system in the two contexts. Moreover, a context characterized by a higher health expenditure, with 
more nurses but higher inequality, may still result in higher child-wasting rates, as it is the case of 
Serbia. 
Two combinations of conditions are sufficient to explain less wasting in ECA countries: 
  Lower GDP and less out-of-pocket health expenditure (the Republic of Moldova);
  Lower inequality, less out-of-pocket health expenditure and more health expenditure (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina).
 
The solution consistency for these conditions is 0.99, however only 33 per cent of the outcome is 
explained under these conditions (coverage 0.33). 
The two paths of conditions explaining lower levels of child wasting are intuitive and inherent to the 
two country contexts they explain. Although explanatory, there may be other combinations of 
conditions that could explain the outcome in the region. 
4.1.3 Neonatal mortality rates
Over the years, trends in neonatal mortality rates have been falling in all countries (see Figure 17). 
Only one country shows any increase over the period; between 2011 and 2015 North Macedonia 
observed increases in the neonatal mortality rate but has since seen rates return to a downward 
trend. 
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Figure 17: Neonatal mortality rates are falling in all ECA countries
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Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Montenegro North Macedonia
Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 





Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. United Nations Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME), 2019.
Source: UNStats, SDG indicators (2020).
 
Three conditions are found to be necessary for higher neonatal mortality: 
  Lower GDP (consistency, 0.94): when we have countries with lower GDP, there are always higher 
rates of neonatal mortality;
  More out-of-pocket expenditure (consistency, 0.81): when we see more out-of-pocket expenditure, 
there are higher rates of neonatal mortality; and, 
  Less health expenditure per capita (consistency, 0.81): when there is less expenditure, there are 
always higher rates of neonatal mortality. 
 
Each of the three conditions that fulfil the necessity criteria are self-explanatory in relation to the 
outcome in that when each condition is present, the outcome is present as well. The three conditions 
have an average consistency score and can be considered as quasi-necessary for higher neonatal 
mortality. However, they provide a powerful statement, in that there is no high neonatal mortality 
among countries in the region without these conditions present. 
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One condition quasi-necessary for lower levels of neonatal mortality is lower levels of fertility. When 
we see lower levels of fertility, we also see lower levels of neonatal mortality – perhaps a logical link 
reflecting demand on health services. 
Two combinations of conditions are sufficient to explain higher neonatal mortality in the pool of 
countries (consistency, 0.82; coverage, 0.75):
  More out-of-pocket expenditure and higher fertility (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Georgia). This path reflects the access to a health care provider for a higher pool of 
children in target countries.
  Lower numbers of nurses, less out-of-pocket health expenditure and less health expenditure (North 
Macedonia). The logical link of this path includes a lower level of out-of-pocket expenditure in a 
context characterised by a limited number of nurses and a reduced health expenditure.
 
Four combinations of conditions are sufficient to explain lower neonatal mortality in the pool of 
countries (consistency, 0.94; coverage, 0.85):
  A higher proportion of nurses, less health expenditure, and lower fertility (Ukraine);
  Higher GDP (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Bulgaria, 
Montenegro);
  Lower out-of-pocket health expenditure, and higher health expenditure (Estonia, Montenegro, 
Bulgaria, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, Latvia);
  A higher proportion of nurses and midwives and less out-of-pocket health expenditure (Croatia, 
Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, The Russian Federation, Estonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina).
 
These paths explaining lower neonatal mortality provide logical combinations of conditions for the 
region’s countries. Notably, high GDP alone is a sufficient condition for the outcome in nine countries 
in the region. Similarly, a high health expenditure combined with lower out-of-pocket payments also 
leads to lower neonatal mortality in nine ECA countries. 
4.1.4 Under-five mortality rates
As with neonatal mortality, mortality rates in children under five years are improving across the 
region (see Figure 18). Downward trends are different in terms of ‘speed’ and most countries seem 
to plateau at rates around 10 deaths per 1,000 live births. Unsurprisingly – given the neonatal results 
– a small bump in North Macedonian trends is seen with the under-five child mortality rate. Geo-
graphically, the countries further east, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan, all see trends run notably higher than the rest of the country group for both 
mortality indicators. 
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Figure 18: All countries have seen falls in the under-five mortality rate since 2006
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Albania Armenia Azerbaijan
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Montenegro North Macedonia
Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 





Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. 
Source: UNStats, SDG indicators (2020).
 
The QCA analysis for under-five child mortality rates includes five conditions: the Gini index, GDP per 
capita (current US$), nurses and midwives per 1,000 persons in the population, out-of-pocket health 
expenditure, and current total health expenditure per capita (see Table 6). 
Two conditions are found to be necessary for higher under-five mortality: a lower level of GDP per 
capita (consistency, 0.91; coverage, 0.53), and more out-of-pocket expenditure (consistency, 0.86; 
coverage, 0.61). In the pool of countries, having either lower GDP or higher out-of-pocket expenditure 
warrants higher under-five mortality rates. 
No conditions were found necessary in achieving lower under-five child mortality.
Three combinations of conditions are sufficient to explain higher under-five child mortality in the pool 
of countries (consistency, 0.68; coverage, 0.65):
  Lower inequality and fewer nurses and midwives in the population (the Republic of Moldova, 
Albania). This path may reflect a scarce medical environment despite overall low inequality rates in 
the two contexts;
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  Lower GDP per capita, more out-of-pocket expenditure, and higher health expenditure (Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan). In the two contexts, more out-of-pocket expenditure may reflect unequal access to 
medical services, despite a higher health expenditure; 
  Higher inequality, more nurses in the population, and more out-of-pocket health expenditure 
(Uzbekistan). Higher inequality rates combined with higher levels of out-of-pocket health 
expenditure may outbalance the relatively high number of nurses in the country when explaining 
higher under-five child mortality. 
 
Two configurational paths, each of one condition, are sufficient to explain lower under-five child 
mortality in the pool of countries: 
  Less out-of-pocket expenditure (Estonia, Romania, Montenegro, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, North Macedonia, Serbia, the Russian Federation, Latvia);
  Higher GDP per capita (Estonia, Latvia, Romania, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Montenegro).
 
The overall solution consistency, that includes the these paths for explaining lower rates of under-five 
child mortality is high (0.89) as is the coverage score (0.79)suggesting that the solutions above cover 
79 per cent of country cases with lower under-five mortality rates.
4.1.5 Youth not in education, employment or training (15-24) - NEET
Following the GFC in 2008, a body of literature seeking to understand the effects of the economic 
downturn on youth unemployment indicated that young people were among the hardest hit following 
the crisis (Scarpetta et al, 2010). Although trends shown in Figure 19 do show, on a few occasions, a 
decline in youth employment, education, and training around 2008, where dips are seen these are 
neither deep nor persistent and as such, give little indication of the crisis’ effects on youth. However, 
the composite nature of the NEET indicator may be the reason for a lack of visible crisis effect. In 
cases where children leaving the labour market move back into school or training, this indicator is 
unlikely to map that shift. Indeed, the general pattern across the region shows persistently stubborn 
rates of youth inactivity, crisis or no crisis, with only a few countries such as Georgia, North 
Macedonia, and Turkey showing meaningful gains in youth activity since 2006. 
The QCA analysis for the NEET outcome involves five conditions: GDP per capita (current USD), GDP 
growth (annual percentage), services value-added (percentage of GDP), labour force participation 
rate (percentage of total population aged 15+), and adolescents out of school (percentage of lower 
secondary school age).
Calibration of the outcome and conditions followed the methodological procedure mentioned in 
Annex 3, in that it used the average values as a middle-level threshold, and the half-standard 
deviation below and above the mean to pinpoint the lower- and upper-level thresholds respectively 
for set memberships.
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For lower NEET, no condition fulfils the necessary criteria of consistency. However, with a consistency 
score of 0.90, it was found that lower GDP is a necessary condition for high NEET. It means that lower 
GDP always triggers a higher proportion of youth not in education, employment, or training. Since 
the condition does not have a perfect consistency score of 1, it is considered as quasi-necessary. Of 
all cases in the sample, Turkey is an outlier where the condition of necessity does not apply. 
Figure 19: In the worst-affected areas of ECA, more than 1 in 4 youth are inactive













































2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan (no data)
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Montenegro North Macedonia
Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan (no data) Kyrgyz Republic (no data) Latvia
Tajikistan Turkey Turkmenistan (no data)
Ukraine Uzbekistan (no data)
Moldova
Romania 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. ILO-modelled estimates, November 2019. For the specific sources by country and the 
estimation methodology refer to ILOSTAT directly.
Source: ILOSTAT (2020).
 
One remark is warranted in the context of the analysis of the necessary conditions. While lower GDP 
is found to be a necessary condition for higher NEET, the opposite is not the case, in that higher GDP 
does not guarantee lower NEET. This causal asymmetry is rarely observed in the analysis of social 
phenomena, hence the importance of conducting separate analyses for the presence and absence of 
the outcome. 
The analysis of sufficient conditions for higher NEET (i.e., a higher proportion of youth not in 
education, employment, or training) results in a parsimonious formula with two logical combinations 
of conditions that are sufficient to explain the outcome:
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  Lower GDP and a higher proportion of services (Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). A higher 
proportion of services in a lower income (GDP) context may reflect on productivity and inefficiency 
of human capital formation;
  Lower proportion of services and a higher proportion of adolescents out of school (Tajikistan, 
Armenia, Moldova, and Turkey). The combination of two conditions reflects poor educational and 
economic outcomes that explain higher NEET in the target countries.
 
The solution consistency is high (0.86), which reflects a high inclusion of empirical evidence in the 
formula. Similarly, the coverage is good (0.68), meaning that the formula explains 68 per cent of cases 
with higher NEET when this outcome is present. 
The analysis of sufficient conditions for lower NEET (i.e., a lower proportion of youth not in 
education, employment, or training) uses the same five conditions. The parsimonious formula 
indicates there are two paths providing a straightforward explanation of the outcome:
  High GDP and lower proportions of adolescents out of school (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, the Russian 
Federation, Kazakhstan);
  High GDP growth and high GDP (Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro, Kazakhstan).
 
Cases can have membership in both paths, as it is the case of Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan, 
because the set membership often overlaps. The overall solution consistency is excellent (0.99) 
suggesting that the claim of sufficiency is fully covered empirically. The coverage score of 0.57 
suggests that the configurations explain 57 per cent of country cases that have lower NEET.
Notably, the condition of labour force participation rate (percentage of total population aged 15+) is 
not part of the sufficient formulas for the presence or absence of the outcome. It indicates that this 
condition is less important to explaining the two sides of the outcome in the pool of countries. 
4.1.6 Children achieving a minimum proficiency level in reading 
Reading proficiency data in the region is limited to three points in time (see Figure 20). Starting in 
2012, the data on reading proficiency shows that on average in the region, around two-thirds of 
children are meeting reading proficiency levels in lower secondary school, a trend that persists for 
the following six years into 2018. Only on a few occasions can we see improvements or declines in 
trends of reading proficiency. Where increases in reading proficiency are seen, these are not 
continuous across the three points or are shown with only two points of data. Upwardly trending 
countries include the Republic of Moldova, North Macedonia, and Turkey; countries seeing falls 
include Bulgaria, Georgia and to a lesser extent, the Russian Federation. Despite the observable 
consistency of these trends, the time between each data point means it is difficult to infer whether 
crises have had any effect on reading proficiency as presently reported in the SDGs. 
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Figure 20: Since 2012 there have been few changes to rates of reading 
proficiency in ECA countries
Proportion of children and young people achieving a minimum proficiency level in reading 















































Albania Armenia (no data) Azerbaijan (no data)
Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria
Montenegro North Macedonia
Russian Federation Serbia
Croatia Estonia Georgia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic (no data) Latvia
Tajikistan (no data) Turkey Turkmenistan (no data)
Ukraine Uzbekistan (no data)
Moldova
Romania 
Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. Data is reporting National Learning Assessment (NLA): Monitoring Trends in 
Educational Growth (MTEG) assessment, Grade 6, minimum proficiency level: 10. 
Source: UNStats, SDG indicators (2020).
 
Five conditions are employed in the QCA analysis to explain the literacy outcome. These are: GDP 
per capita (current USD), Gini index, services value-added (percentage of GDP), children out of school 
(percentage of primary school age, and adolescents out of school (percentage of lower secondary 
school age).
Data has been calibrated in-line with the methodological note in Annex 3. Average values were used 
to define the middle-level threshold for set membership of the outcome and conditions. In addition, 
the half- standard deviation above and below the mean was used to define the upper- (high literacy) 
and lower-level threshold (low literacy) for set membership in outcome and conditions. 
The analysis of necessity finds no condition meeting the required consistency threshold of a 
minimum 0.80 or higher to be a necessary condition for higher or lower literacy rates. It means that 
no condition alone warrants the occurrence of higher and lower literacy rates in the pool of cases. 
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The analysis of sufficiency is performed by employing the configurational logic of all conditions and 
linking them to higher or lower rates of literacy. The parsimonious solution finds three configurations 
of conditions explaining lower literacy rates. These configurations are: 
  Lower GDP, and higher rates of services value-added (Georgia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria);
  Lower proportions of out-of-school primary children and higher proportions of adolescents out of 
school (North Macedonia, and Montenegro);
  Higher GDP, lower Gini, and lower rates of services value-added (Kazakhstan).
 
In the four paths, the specifics linked to lower GDP, higher proportion of out-of-school children, and 
lower rates of services value-added define the way configurations explain the lower literacy rates. 
However, more evidence is needed to fully explain the effects of these conditions on the measured 
outcome.
The consistency score of the overall solution formula that includes the three paths is 0.92, meaning 
that the claim that these configurations are sufficient for lower literacy to occur is highly supported by 
empirical evidence. The coverage score of 0.54 indicates that altogether the configurations explain 54 
per cent of lower literacy in countries where this outcome is present. Montenegro has membership in 
two configurations because the membership in configuration of sets often overlaps.
The analysis of sufficient conditions for higher literacy rates employs the same set of conditions and 
results in a parsimonious formula with four paths of configurations:
  Higher proportions of out-of-school primary children and lower proportions of adolescents out of 
school (Ukraine);
  Higher Gini. lower rates of services value-added and higher proportions of out-of-school primary 
children (Turkey);
  Higher GDP, higher rates of services value-added and lower proportions of out-of-school primary 
children (Croatia, Latvia, and Estonia);
  Higher GDP, higher Gini and lower proportions of out-of-school primary children (Latvia, and the 
Russian Federation).
 
The overall solution consistency for the four paths is high (0.86) and the coverage is good (0.70). The 
case of Latvia is covered by two configurations of conditions because the set membership overlaps. 
The four paths engage with a number of conditions that, in combination with other conditions, 
explain the higher literacy rates in specific contexts. The defining conditions are: lower proportions of 
out-of-school children; higher GDP rates; and higher rates of services value-added. More research is 
needed to fully explore the range of involvement of employed conditions with the explained outcome. 
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4.1.7 Suicide rates in older adolescents aged 15-19 
Figure 21 maps trends in suicide rates in the ECA region and shows that a number of countries are 
without data or trend data for the period 2006 to 2017. Also notable from the graph is that the rate of 
suicide in the region is very volatile: Croatia, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, and Latvia all contribute to a very 
inconsistent trend picture in the top right-hand chart (see Figure 21). There is no indication of an 
uptick in adolescent suicide rates on or near the years related to the financial crises in 2008 or 2015 
across the trends. 
Figure 21: Suicide rate trends show volatility in Estonia and Croatia and a 
steady increase in Uzbekistan
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Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. 
Source: WHO mortality database, 2020. 
 
For the QCA analysis of suicide rates among children, the following conditions are employed: GDP 
per capita (current USD), the Gini index, adolescents out of school (percentage of lower secondary 
school age), hospital beds (per 1,000 people), and current health expenditure per capita, PPP (current 
international USD).
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For the analysis of necessary conditions linked to higher and lower suicide rates, no condition meets 
a consistency threshold that is high enough to meet the criteria for necessity. The conclusion is that 
in the pool of countries, no condition alone warrants the presence or absence of the outcome. 
The analysis of sufficient conditions outlines all logical combinations of conditions that may lead to 
higher or lower suicide rates. The parsimonious solution for higher suicide rates shows one 
combination of conditions that is sufficient for the outcome:
  Higher GDP, and lower inequality (Gini) (Croatia, Estonia, Kazakhstan). In these specific contexts, 
cultural and age-specific determinants may compromise children’s mental health, which would 
result in relatively higher suicide rates for the region. 
 
The overall solution consistency is high (0.86), which shows that the configurational path of 
conditions is well-embedded in the empirical evidence and the coverage is good (0.81). The solution 
coverage score of 0.40 indicates that the combination of conditions explains 40 per cent of cases 
where relatively higher suicide rates are present. 
The analysis of sufficient conditions for lower suicide rates employs the same five causal conditions 
as for higher suicide rates. On the basis of available cases (i.e., those cases with lower suicide rates 
based on the established middle-level threshold), the analysis indicates there are two sufficient 
combinations linked to lower suicide rates:
  Higher GDP and higher current health expenditure (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia);
  Higher equality (Gini) and higher proportions of adolescents out of school (Bulgaria, Turkey, 
Romania, Armenia, North Macedonia, and Tajikistan).
 
The formula of sufficient conditions for lower suicide rates has a high consistency score (0.90) and 
the coverage is good (0.68). The analysis demonstrated that no condition was individually sufficient 
for lower suicide rates; only in conjunction with one other causal condition specified above does a 
condition explain lower suicide rates. These paths emphasize the leading role of higher health 
expenditure and the lower inequality that, in combination with other conditions, leads to relatively 
lower rates of suicide among children. Interestingly, the condition that provides data on the number 
of hospital beds (per 1,000 people) is not present in any configuration of sufficient conditions for 
either the presence or absence of the outcome. Considering the complex mechanisms at work 
influencing suicide rates among children, further research is warranted to engage with more 
conditions in order to fully understand this outcome in the region. 
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4.1.8 Intentional homicide rates in children aged 0-14 years 
The final child-focused SDG outcome to be analysed using QCA is the intentional homicide rate 
among the 0-14 age group. Figure 22 below shows the trends from 2006 for ECA countries. The trends 
show a great deal of volatility in most cases and overall, indicate that the latest figure reported in 
Table 3 is low in comparison to recent years but is not a safe indication of an overall downward trend. 
Figure 22: In all countries since 2006, the homicide rate rarely peaks 
above 1 in 100,000 children
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Notes: Trend lines run from the first to the last observed data points; markers represent years with observed data. For years with no 
markers, no data for that country was reported. 
Source: WHO mortality database, 2020. 
 
Conditions employed in the QCA analysis of intentional homicide rates in children (0-14 years old) are 
the Gini index, GDP per capita (current US$), labour force participation rate, total (percentage of total 
population aged 15+), population density (people per sq. km of land area), and intentional homicides 
(per 100,000 people).
Outcome and conditions were calibrated into partial set membership scores using middle-, upper-, and 
lower-level thresholds. For the middle-level threshold, average values were used while for upper- and 
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lower-level thresholds, the half-standard deviation above and below the mean were used respectively 
to define the respective set membership scores (see Annex 3 for the full methodological note). 
An analysis of necessary conditions has been conducted for both the presence (higher homicide 
rates) and absence (lower homicide rates) of the outcome. There is no condition fulfilling the criteria 
of necessary for either higher or lower levels of homicide rates among children in the pool of 
countries. In other words, no condition alone guarantees the occurrence of higher or lower homicide 
rates in the sample of cases. 
The analysis of sufficient conditions assesses which combination of conditions leads to higher or 
lower homicide rates among children. For higher child homicide rates, two combinations of 
conditions are sufficient to explain this outcome in the pool of countries: 
  Lower inequality (Gini) and higher population density (the Republic of Moldova, Croatia); 
  Higher inequality (Gini), higher rates of intentional homicide and lower population density (Latvia, 
Montenegro).
 
The consistency score of the formula, encompassing both solutions, is 0.70 which indicates that the 
status of sufficiency is largely supported by empirical evidence. The coverage score of 0.44 indicates 
that both combinations of conditions explain roughly 44 per cent of cases where relatively higher 
homicide rates are present. 
The two paths reflect a role for the population density; higher inequality and higher rates of 
intentional homicide which, in combination with other factors, lead to higher rates of child homicide 
in the pool of ECA countries. 
Analysis of sufficient conditions for lower homicide 0-14 rates indicates there are three paths 
sufficient to explain the outcome:
  Higher labour force participation, lower rates of intentional homicide and lower population density 
(Estonia, Georgia);
  Lower inequality (Gini), lower rates of intentional homicide and lower population density (Estonia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina);
  Lower GDP, higher labour force participation and higher rates of intentional homicide (Kyrgyzstan, 
Armenia).
 
Four conditions stand out as meaningful for lower homicide rates in the 0-14 year old population the 
three paths above: higher labour force participation; lower rates of homicide; lower population 
density; and lower inequality. However, only in combination with other conditions they lead to the 
outcome, and reflects the complexity of conditions that explain a complex outcome. A high 
consistency score (0.91) supports the status of sufficiency. The coverage score of 0.51 indicates than 
more than half of cases with lower 0-14 homicide rates are explained by one of these three 
combinations. 
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4.2 Economic trends and the elasticity of child poverty, nourishment, and well-being in 
Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
This section looks at the elasticity of poverty and child well-being indicators in relation to the 
economic and social determinants, using macro-pooled time series from 2006 to 2018. The QCA 
analysis complements the elasticity analysis in that it looks at children’s well-being from a con-
figurational logic, as per interlinkages of conditions leading to the presence and absence of the 
outcome. The methods for generating these elasticities are available for review in Annex 3.2 of this 
document. Figure 23 reports two sets of coefficients for nine well-being outcomes aligned to those 
reviewed in this paper (limited data for nutrition and proficiency data resulted in the use of proxies). 
The first bar for each outcome in the figure represents the association to GDP per capita (log)10 in the 
year before the outcome measure, pre-controls. The second bar runs the same test, including 
controls. The blue bars report negative associations between outcomes and increases in GDP per 
capita, the red bars report positive associations. Each bar has an effect size reported at the top and 
where effect sizes are in boxes, these are significant results. 
In each case, the effect size is interpreted in relation to a percentage point increase related to a 1 per 
cent change in GDP per capita (not statistical elasticities, these measures are interpreted in relation to 
real value changes). However, poverty measures and undernourishment are log values of these SDG 
indicators and therefore should be interpreted as elasticity measures (the percent change for a 1 per 
cent change in GDP per capita – see Annex table 3.1). 
Findings for poverty measurement and undernourishment (SDGs 1 and 2)
The effect sizes reported for the higher poverty threshold of US$3.20 per day show that following the 
inclusion of controls, the significant association between a 1 per cent change in GDP per capita and 
the percent change in persons under the poverty rate was not significant. Controls included 
population density, the age dependency ratio, the Gini index, and numbers of employed persons (all 
logged). The latter two variables did report a significant relationship with the percentage point 
change in persons living below the US$3.20 per day threshold – both in expected directions – with a 
higher Gini index associating to higher poverty, and lower employment to higher poverty.
10  Simple explanation of the logarithm here. 
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Figure 23: GDP per capita retains significant effects on most key SDG 
indicators following controls
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Source: Author’s calculations of data. Sources reported in Annex Table 1.1, series from 2006 to 2018 where data is available. Full data, 
including lists of control variables, and associated test statistics are reported in Annex Table 3.1.
 
Regarding the more extreme poverty threshold of US$1.90 per day (extreme poverty), and following 
the inclusion of controls, the 1 per cent change in GDP per capita remained a significant predictor of 
elasticity in the extreme poverty rate. Results show that a 1 per cent change in GDP per capita is 
associated with 1.1 per cent change in extreme poverty in the ECA region. Unlike the US$3.20 
threshold, neither the employment nor remittance controls were significant associates to extreme 
poverty. However, the Gini index was again significant in the expected direction. The elasticity of 
extreme poverty to GDP per capita, above 1 per cent indicates that the extreme poor in ECA countries 
have a higher sensitivity to economic growth and contraction than the population on average. This is 
a significant finding, considering the contractions in economic growth expected following COVID-19 
lockdowns. 
Undernourishment in the population, measured in terms of individual daily consumption, was 
included as a proxy measure for child and family nutritional conditions in the absence of sufficient 
data for wasting and stunting for comparisons in the region. Results for undernourishment show very 
weak associations with changes in GDP per capita. In neither model was the GDP predictor 
significant. Among controls in the post-test however, indicators for food supply and age dependency 
were both significant and in expected directions: a 1 per cent change in the food supply – measured 
in terms of the total supply of calories per person, per day – is reported alongside a 2.3 per cent 
increase in undernourishment. This is indicative of an unequal supply of food across countries in the 
region on average and as such, indicates that falls in food supply are an indicator of malnutrition risk 
in ECA countries. 
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Findings for other child well-being measures (SDGs 3, 4, 8, and 16)
To interpret the coefficients for associations not reporting statistical elasticities, take the case of 
under-five child mortality. For this measure’s pre-controls, the effect size -7.6 refers to an estimated 
7.6 percentage point fall in the under-five mortality rates for a 1 per cent increase in GDP per capita. 
This fall is relative to the regional average over the period (16.4 deaths per 1,000). In real terms, this 
-7.6-percentage point fall can be reported as 1.25 deaths per 1,000 children under five ((16.4/100) * 7.6 
= 1.25). This means, across the ECA region since 2006, an increase of 1 per cent of GDP per capita is 
associated with a -1.9-percentage point fall in under-five child mortality rates, or in other words, 0.33 
fewer deaths per 1,000 children under the age of five. 
Controls include: public and private health care costs; life expectancy; immunization; primary school 
completion; population density; age-dependency; and numbers of physicians per 1,000 people.
For neonatal mortality rates, a 1 per cent change in GDP per capita is a significant correlate after 
controls for life expectancy, immunizations, primary school completion, population density, and the 
age-dependency ratio. In the case of neonatal mortality, physicians in the population were replaced 
with the number of nurses and midwives per 1,000 people. The controlled model reports a 
-2.2-percentage point fall in the number of neonatal deaths for a reported 1 per cent increase in GDP 
per capita. As the average rate of neonatal mortality in the region since 2006 is 8.7 per cent, this 
effect size is equivalent to 0.2 fewer deaths per 1,000 infants per 1 per cent change in GDP per capita.
Due to the lack of data available on reading proficiency by country, it was not possible to include this 
learning outcome in the macro-pooled time series analysis. As a replacement, or a proxy for learning 
outcomes, tests have been run to estimate the association of the change in lagged GDP per capita 
with the lower secondary school completion rate in ECA. In both models, pre- and post-controls, the 
association between GDP per capita and lower secondary school completion is insignificant. Better 
data in the region is required for both learning outcomes and education expenditures in order for 
future research to provide better indications of macroeconomic and public policy effects on children’s 
educational outcomes. 
Results for NEET rates show that: inclusion in the model of primary school completion; overall labour 
force participation in the population;, the level of remittances; population density; and the age-
dependency ratio all do little to reduce the association between a 1 per cent change in GDP per capita 
and the percentage point change in the average NEET rate in the region. Indeed, for every 1 per cent 
increase in GDP per capita, a percentage point change in the NEET rate is -6.7. For those countries 
with data, since 2006 the average NEET rate has stood at 21.5 per cent – around one in five youth 
– meaning that a 1 per cent change in GDP per capita in the region is associated with a 1.4 per cent 
fall in NEET rates on average. 
A complex picture is seen in adolescent suicide in the ECA region. The association between a 1 
per cent increase in GDP per capita and suicide is positive and significant, both before and after 
controls (including labour force participation population density and the age-dependency ratio). 
The coefficient shows that this accounts for around 5.3 percentage points on the suicide scale. Since 
2006, across the region suicide rates have averaged 5.8 per 100,000 of the 15-to-19-year-old pop-
ulation. This means this coefficient is equivalent to a 0.33 increase in deaths by suicide in the 15-to-
19-year-old population reported, on average, for every 1 per cent increase in GDP per capita. 
As with the QCA study, the association between traditionally positive macroeconomic indicators 
and increased suicide is difficult to explain and may be due to a lack of complete data on suicide 
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reporting practices, or a lack of power in the statistical modelling. Nevertheless, it is worth 
considering that income and wealth, as operationalized using GDP per capita, may not be a protective 
factor against suicide, and may instead be indicative of conditions in which some children and youth 
feel isolated from the benefits of growth and wealth, for various reasons, to the detriment of their 
mental health. 
In the case of intentional homicides in the total population, this figure has been included in the 
absence of sufficient data on intentional homicides in the child population over the period 2006 to 
2018, and in the absence of other suitable comparative child or youth-focused violence statistics for 
the region. Results show that a 1 per cent change in the GDP per capita in ECA is associated with a 1.7 
percentage point fall in the number of homicides per 100,000 of the population. In the region since 
2006 the average annual homicide rate was reported to be 0.39 deaths per 100,000 of the population. 
This means that a post-control coefficient of 0.39 is equivalent to 0.06 fewer deaths per 100,000 
people in the ECA region for each 1 per cent change in GDP per capita. The controls in this test 
included: political stability; the rule of law; percentage changes in overall labour force participation; 
population density; and the age-dependency ratio. 
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5. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS: WHAT ARE THE COVID-19 RISKS FOR CHILD 
WELL-BEING IN THE SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM? 
This section of the report brings together the findings of predictors of poverty and child well-being 
across the previous sections. It provides recommendations of which indicators can be used in macro-
level situation analysis and monitoring in countries in ECA as the COVID-19 crisis unfolds. Country 
stakeholders should read this section with reference to SDG indicators in Table 3 and the trend data 
reported throughout this paper. Based on this trend data and COVID-19 caseload data, short- and 
medium-term effects will also be discussed.
5.1 Recommendations for the monitoring of child well-being and economic indicators 
Table 7 summarizes the findings of the analysis undertaken in Section 4. The economic, social, and 
health conditions most closely associated with child poverty and well-being in the region are 
mapped. The column reporting sufficient conditions shows the combinations of factors from the QCA 
shown to increase the likelihood of reporting better or worse outcomes by child indicators. 
Increases to national poverty rates, and extreme poverty rates, are closely associated to income 
inequality. In the case of the most poor (under US$1.90 per day), the expected fall in economic 
productivity and GDP per capita is likely to result in worsening conditions for in comparison to 
average persons in ECA countries. In both poverty measures, social determinants are also at play. 
Reductions in employment in a country and restrictions to earnings (and therefore remittances) 
outside a country are also shown to have significant independent associations with poverty risk. 
Higher unemployment increases the rate of dependency in a country which can compound age 
dependency effects, another correlate with extreme poverty. The GDP per capita measure is lagged 
by one year in every case, to that end, there is more confidence that a fall in GDP per capita in a given 
year is associated to increases in extreme forms of income poverty in the following year. Alongside 
general monitoring for GDP contractions, countries in the region with high income inequality, low 
employment rates, and high dependency ratios should be particularly attentive (see Table 3). This set 
of findings from the elasticity tests is supported by sufficient conditions for increasing and 
decreasing rates of national poverty risk in the region. 
Nutrition indicators included in each test were different. The wasting data analysed using the QCA 
analysis showed that in several countries, sets of conditions were linked to a higher risk of wasting. 
The conditions were mixed in all cases, with at least one of the factors listed being counter-intuitive. 
In these cases, the results are interpreted as being robust (see Section 4 and Annex 3) and are an 
indication that contrary positive conditions are insufficient to protect a country from poor outcomes 
when reported together. The opposite is true when better outcomes are being reported. In the case of 
high risk of wasting, for instance, higher total health expenditures overall are a sufficient condition, in 
combination with higher inequality and higher rate of household out-of-pocket costs for healthcare. 
To this end, high rates of total health expenditure in and of themselves are not a protective factor 
against wasting when relative personal health costs and inequality are high. 
Moreover, in certain conditions (including where Gini and total health expenditures are high, or where 
total health expenditure is simply low)having more than the average number of nurses and midwives 
per 1,000 people is not enough to protect children under five from a higher risk of wasting. 
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Because contrasting conditions are found in the explanations for low risk of wasting (lower inequality, 
lower out of pocket costs, alongside high total health expenditure)a message for ECA countries – 
apart from ‘inequality being an important condition for determining extreme conditions like wasting’ 
– is that health expenditure, and the manner in which it is invested (targeted or distributed), would 
need to be studied in more detail to understand why higher levels of expenditure are not consistently 
linked with better outcomes. Several possible explanations could include: higher spending due to 
higher need in a population, less effective spending in some countries where demand is comparable, 
or time lags. . 
Due to data limitations, undernourishment rates in the population were used in elasticity tests in 
place of wasting. Food supply and dependency ratios were both significantly associated and in each 
case, are subject to fluctuations in employment and productivity. As noted, with falls in food supply 
having a larger relative effect on rates of undernourishment, countries should seek to protect 
employment, stimulate food supply sectors, and promote progressive interventions. 
Measures on infant mortality have consistently reported findings across both analytical methods in 
relation to effects of the protective factors of GDP per capita. At present, GDP per capita is both a 
necessary condition for low neonatal and under-five child mortality and a significant lagged associate 
with percentage changes in GDP per capita. Every country in the region, particularly those with high 
rates of child mortality, those with lower-than-average GDP per capita, or those that experienced 
periods of recovery in 2008 and 2015, should closely monitor the effect of economic contraction on 
child survival. Other evidence for the studies suggests that within the group of countries, further risks 
to child mortality include higher rates of health expenditure by households. This measure, with other 
measures of health expenditure in the model (specifically lower public expenditure), and the role of 
preventative interventions (immunization rates), is indicative of the health risk that may follow from 
under-resourced health systems. Aside from the immediate indication that the strength of a health 
system is a key variable for monitoring in ECA during COVID-19, this finding implies that COVID-19 
can affect chances of child survival through: overburdening of the health system, and a higher 
reliance on private health care in the general population, and failing to maintain standard public 
health services (e.g. immunizations). 
As with nutrition, the sufficient conditions coming from the QCA provide an indication of the 
combination of factors producing high or low risk to child mortality and on occasion, where certain 
‘positive’ measures do not function as protective factors. Again, the effects of GDP per capita, in 
combination with low out-of-pocket health costs and other factors, are mostly intuitive. Evidence for 
an independent protective effect of nurse and midwife numbers or higher total health expenditure, in 
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Table 7: Summary of the empirical findings: Economic, social and health conditions related to poverty 
and child well-being 
Outcome 
area
Indicator Economic measures Social measures Health measures Sufficient conditions (for country 





Gini Index (h); Gini (h), GDP pc (h), employment (h) / 
remittance (l); 
National poverty falling Gini (l), employment (l); social 
protection (l), GDP (l); GDP pc (h), Gini 
(l); Gini (l), social protection (l). 
3.2 dollar % increase Gini index; % fall employment; % fall 
remittances
1.9 dollar % fall GDP pc; % increase 
Gini; 
% increase dependency 
ratio 
Nutrition Wasting: high risk Out-of-pocket health expenditure (h), 
total health expenditure (h); Gini (h), 
nurses and midwives (h), total health 
expenditure (h); nurses and midwives 
(h), out-of-pocket health expenditure (l), 
total health expenditure (l).
Wasting: low risk GDP pc (l), out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (l); Gini (l), out-of-pocket 
health expenditure (l), total health 
expenditure (h).
Undernourishment % fall in overall food 
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Indicator Economic measures Social measures Health measures Sufficient conditions (for country 
details, see Section 4)
Health Under-5 mortality: high 
risk
GDP pc (l) Out of pocket health 
expenditure (h)
Gini (l), nurse and midwives (l); GDP pc 
(l), out of pocket expenditure (h), total 
health expenditure (h); • Gini (h), nurse 
and midwives (h), GDP pc (l)/out of 
pocket health expenditure (h) / total 
health expenditure (l).
Under-5 mortality: low risk % increase GDP pc % increase in population 
density; % primary 
completion rates
% increase in private 
health expenditure pc; % 
increase in immunization; 
Out-of-pocket expenditures (l); GDP pc 
(h).
Neonatal mortality: high 
risk
GDP pc (l) Out of pocket health 
expenditure (h) 
Health expenditure per 
capita (l)
Out-of-pocket expenditure (h), fertility 
(h); nurse and midwives (h), out-of-
pocket health spend (l), total health 
expenditure (l). 
Neonatal mortality: low 
risk
% increase GDP pc Lower levels of fertility; % 
increase in population 
density; 
% increase in 
immunization; % increase 
in nurse and midwives
Nurses and midwives (h), total health 
expenditure (l), lower fertility (l); GDP pc 
(h); out-of-pocket health expenditure (l) 
total health expenditure (h); nurses and 
midwives (h), out-of-pocket health 
expenditure (l); nurses and midwives (l), 
total health expenditure health (l), 
fertility (l).
Suicide: high risk % increase GDP pc GDP per capita (h) Gini (l)
Suicide: low risk GDP pc (h), total health expenditure (h); 
Gini (h), adolescents OOS (h)
Education Proficiency rates: high OOSC (h), adolescents OOS (l); Gini (h), 
services value- added (l), OOSC (h); GDP 
pc (h), services value-added (h), OOSC 
(l); GDP pc (h), Gini index (h), OOSC (l)
Proficiency rates: low GDP pc (l), services value-added (h); 
OOSC (l), adolescents OOS (h); GDP pc 




 % age dependency ratio; 
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Indicator Economic measures Social measures Health measures Sufficient conditions (for country 
details, see Section 4)
Youth 
employment
NEET rates: high risk GDP pc (l) Lower GDP pc (l); services value-added 
(h); services value- added (l), 
adolescents OOS (h).
NEET rates: low risk % increase GDP pc Increase in labour force 
participation (all)
GDP growth (h); adolescents OOS (l); 
GDP growth (h), GDP pc (h).
Violence Intentional mortality in 
total population
% increase in political 
stability index; % 
dependency ratio; % 
increase in population 
density;
Intentional mortality in 
children: high risk
Gini index (l), population density (h); 
Gini index (h), intentional homicide (all) 
(h), population density (l)
Intentional mortality in 
children: low risk
Labour force participation (h), 
intentional homicide (all) (l), population 
density (l); Gini index (l) intentional 
homicide (l), population density (l); GDP 
pc (l), labour force participation (h), 
intentional homicide (all) (h)
Notes: (h) = higher groups, (l) lower groups as reported in Table 3 and applied in the Qualitative Comparative Analysis. 
Source: See Section 4. 
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Results for high suicide risk are consistent across tests and explained above. Results of the QCA for 
lower suicide risk provide an indication that total health care expenditure can act as a protective 
factor as GDP per capita increases. Not ‘being in school’, in cases where income inequality is high, 
may also be protective – a finding which may be partly explained both by low overall numbers of 
suicide and by school as a place where bullying can occur. Such findings are counterintuitive when 
considering the impacts of poverty and related stressors so it is hard to place this factor in the realm 
of ‘social and economic costs’ of COVID-19. Rather, countries with higher suicide rates should instead 
seek to understand children’s personal experiences of COVID-19 as a priority and specifically in light 
of the pressures of lockdown on mental health. 
Like nutrition indicators, indicators of education used in both empirical tests were different. This was 
due to a lack of proficiency data in the region over recent years. In macro-pooled time series tests, 
completion of lower secondary school was used as a next-best proxy for learning outcomes. In QCA 
results, no necessary conditions were found. Sufficient conditions provided mixed results overall, 
where only two sets of conditions – GDP per capita and high proficiency, and Gini (counterintuitively) 
in cases of both high and low proficiency – were consistent in terms of their contribution to sets of 
sufficient conditions defining literacy proficiency score grouping. This does not mean countries can 
disregard effects of the economic crisis on learning and education but rather, should seek to 
understand it in national contexts and acknowledge the conditions most likely to emerge during 
COVID-19 that will accentuate or mitigate negative effects – such as adolescents being out of school 
or low demand from sectors employing younger workers. Moreover, these data do not account for 
school closures of the type seen during COVID-19. 
Youth activation results across the two studies show very consistent findings, both in terms of higher 
risk of NEET rates and in conditions required to keep NEET rates low. Lower levels of GDP per capita 
are a necessary condition for high NEET rates, meaning more young people are not in employment, 
or when GDP per capita is lower. Changes in GDP per capita in the years before NEET rates are 
measured are significantly negatively associated. Overall labour market participation, service sector 
size, GDP growth, and numbers of adolescents out of school are meaningful contributors under 
various conditions. Countries should be aware of which labour market sectors have a higher demand 
for younger workers and recognise the lessons from the GFC, where general downturns in overall 
labour market participation disproportionately affected youth (Scarpetta et al, 2010). This calls for a 
monitoring of labour market participation by sector and of barriers to school entry in countries where 
service sector employment is low. 
Evidence on violence suggest that in the ECA region, overall rates of intentional homicide are 
significantly associated with social conditions such as political stability, an increase in population 
density, and age dependency ratios, where each condition is associated with lower rates of general 
violence. For the effect directly on the child population, only QCA is possible, with overall higher rates 
of intentional homicide a co-condition of higher inequality and lower population density. Lower 
inequality and higher population density also predict higher child mortality in some countries where 
overall homicide is not part of the sufficient conditions. Sufficient conditions for a lower rate of child 
homicide show that higher labour market participation, lower population destiny, lower inequality, 
and lower homicide overall play a role. In the case where higher homicide rates overall are a part of 
sufficient conditions for lower child homicides, countries have a lower GDP per capita, and higher 
labour force participation. Measures of social cohesion, stressors related to inequality, and isolation 
are promising areas for monitoring both overall rates of violence and in turn, the potential for these to 
disproportionately affect children.
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5.2 Indications of the medium- and longer-term impacts
All of the evidence in the section above speaks most directly to short-term effects based on year lags 
in the GDP data and extrapolating immediate reactions to changes in economic and social conditions 
during the crisis. To provide an indication of the medium- and long-term effects of the crisis, some 
basic approaches to reading the data are recommended. 
First, based on trends related to the protracted nature and depth of economic contraction following 
the GFC and the Russian economic crisis of 2014-15, some indication of longer-term effects can be 
gleaned. Referring to Figure 2 and to trends in GDP per capita since 2008, evidence from across the 
region finds that only two countries show no fall in GDP per capita in 2009 (Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan); in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova and Tajikistan the dip lasted just one 
year. Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, North Macedonia, the Russian 
Federation, and Turkey saw a two-year dip. The remaining countries – with the exception of Estonia 
with a four-year dip – of Armenia, Croatia, Latvia, Romania, and Serbia did not see GDP per capita 
recover to 2008 levels until 2016, 2017 or 2018 and in some cases, influenced by the second crisis. 
Using elasticity statistics, which are better measures for understanding cumulative effects of 
contraction, and information on the actual falls in GDP per capita terms, countries can begin to 
indicate the depth and persistence of poverty risk over the next few years, should COVID-19 trends 
replicate the GFC. 
For a more elaborate set of predictions, a review the COVID-19 caseloads, trends, and lockdowns 
shown in Figure 14 could be informed using examples from the European Union and East Asia in 
terms of the timing of lockdown to estimate the length of time countries may be closed and the 
implications for economic contraction. These can be compared in a set of projections, including a 
GFC scenario as outlined above, or in various contraction estimates based on a range of lockdown 
scenarios. 
A second way to infer the medium- to long-term effects is based upon connections between short-
term effects on certain economic and social outcomes and how these outcomes are likely to affect 
other poverty and well-being outcomes in the future. One example is the link between dependency 
ratios and child and family outcomes (see Table 7 linking this with poverty, nutrition, education, and 
violence). Another is the potential increase in ‘effective’ dependency in a population brought about by 
high-end service needs (e.g., secondary health care), and more basic needs such as unemployment 
benefits or supports. In both cases, due to the health crisis and economic contraction, these 
conditions are to be expected (or are presently seen) and will increase pressures on social welfare 
budgets before predicted austerity (see reference to effect of stimulus and austerity in the GFC period 
in Table 1). Altogether the present response to COVID-19 and the lessons from the GFC indicate that a 
series of knock on effects form the initial economic downturn (and a balancing of budgets following 
stimulus packages) will compound risks to family and children well-being over time. 
An additional examination of population structure country by country (see Annex 2 and Section 3.2), 
and future dependency ratios, is a reasonable way to estimate future needs and resource constraints 
relevant to achieving child and family goals in country. 
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICIES TO PROTECT CHILDREN POST-
COVID-19 
The final section of this report compares evidence of the mitigating effects of social protection 
policies in previous crises (see Table 2) with the predicted risk to poverty and well-being in families 
and children in the ECA region (see Section 4), and the COVID-19-related social protection and fiscal 
policies in ECA (see Tables 4 and 5) to assess if these policies will effectively protect children and 
families from income poverty risks and vulnerability to poor well-being outcomes. Where evidence 
suggests that policies may be less effective or ineffective, recommendations on the type of public 
policies needed to protect families and children in ECA countries from ill-effects of the crisis will be 
offered in Section 6.2. This section concludes with summary remarks. 
6.1 Are existing post-COVID-19 social protection and fiscal stimulus policies fit for 
purpose? 
COVID-19 and Social Protection Policies in ECA countries
The literature review reported in Table 2 shows that income poverty in childhood can be mitigated 
during crises through the provision of cash transfers, unemployment benefits to parents, active 
labour market policies or public works programmes, and fiscal stimulus. In contrast, austerity 
following the GFC had the effect of increasing poverty risks and during crises, unemployment 
benefits have in some cases led to extended periods of unemployment. More specifically, evidence 
shows that the modality of cash transfers, even during periods of crisis (as in normal times), and the 
detail of the payment criteria are important factors for determining the effect of the benefit in both 
poverty reduction and outcomes such as gender equality. 
In ECA countries, evidence from the tests above suggests that effective anti-poverty policies – for 
both national thresholds and absolute poverty measures – work in tandem with lower overall income 
inequality. This inevitably means those policies need to reach the poorest and most vulnerable, 
irrespective of their employment status (certainly as workplaces close and economic contraction 
further reduces employment opportunities) and eligibility related to social contributions. Benefits 
should also be adequate in amounts, raising whole families – regardless of size, structure, and 
circumstance – above minimum income levels of national poverty thresholds. This requires 
increments related to family size, family structure, child age (when care responsibilities can crowd out 
work) and for children with disabilities. In short, such benefits should meet the standards of 
progressive universalism, where payments are available to all families with children and additional 
payments are available in cases of families with higher need. 
Moreover, in ECA countries, employment, GDP per capita, and the level of remittances were also 
significant drivers of poverty, and therefore successful public policy responses to COVID-19 will need 
to address some of these issues directly – including through the application of fiscal stimulus. 
Evidence from Table 4 shows that the majority of countries have implemented social assistance 
benefits, with the exception of utility waivers and the Bosnia and Herzegovina active labour market 
policy. These benefits are targeted on subgroups of the population or are means-tested, or both. 
However, almost one-third, are linked to employment – past or present – through furloughing 
schemes (emergency unemployment payments) or changes to existing social insurance 
unemployment schemes. Additionally, recipient numbers covered can also be very modest (where 
data is available). 
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Although each of these benefits will undoubtedly do some good (e.g., social insurance to address 
short-term unemployment in the formal sector is a reasonable reform), when not in combination or 
undertaken for sufficient periods of time at sufficient level of payment, they will be inadequate to 
meet the needs of the entire population (at a time of universal effects), even before details of their 
mitigation of various risks to poverty and well-being are fully understood. 
A caution on the effectiveness of means-tested benefits and stringent targeting: at present, benefits 
are allocated on the basis of existing definitions and conditions related to poverty or vulnerability. 
This means, people who are ‘near-poor’ in ECA countries, e.g. people who are likely to be pushed into 
poverty groups as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis, will not be receiving support now and are 
likely to miss out of COVID-19 related supports, but yet experience the following poverty risks and 
austerity risks. Countries need to monitor and respond to these cases. 
The second major concern in regard to the COVID-19 social protection response is how temporary the 
schemes are in all cases where data is available. Of all the reforms covered in Table 4, only one is a 
permanent reform – expansion of an existing social assistance cash transfer in North Macedonia. The 
remainder are one-off and last between one and four months (17), or 6 to 12 months (4). Section 5.2 
shows that only six countries in the ECA region experienced the GFC contraction in the short term 
(one year or less). The majority saw the effects in the medium term or longer, with at least four 
countries experiencing GDP per capita rates at a sub-2008 level for up to a decade. 
Along with the two issues of coverage and timing of benefits, countries will have to review levels of 
payment to determine if these are adequate for need in country. Within-country variations in 
household costs and consumption (including changes in out-of-pocket costs for health and education 
services) and in inflation need to be considered in the first instance and tracked over time. In order 
for benefits paid regularly, the indexing of these benefits to retail or consumer price indexes, in 
comparison to flat rates, will need to be known if adequacy over time is to be appropriately assessed 
with a view to household consumption and costs and market fluctuations. 
Where local social protection benefits are favoured over national responses, countries need to 
address the effects on within-country inequality and in turn, how this inequality influences poverty 
risks and other child and family outcomes (e.g., as in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan). 
COVID-19 policies for better nutrition
Table 2 shows that food parcels are an effective way of preventing malnutrition among children. 
The review also made clear the role of school feeding programmes in meeting the nutritional needs 
of children; however, until the majority of children return to school, such interventions will have a 
limited impact. Cash transfers, although shown to increase food security among households, have 
mixed results when evaluated for nutritional outcomes in children, which may partly explain the lack 
of direct association with economic conditions in tests. Although results for the social and economic 
conditions tests affecting wasting and nutrition are only found in combinations of factors, the rate of 
undernourishment in the general population was significantly associated by food supply in a country 
at a level which indicated an inequality in the distribution of foodstuffs. 
The literature review and tests together indicate that an effective response to COVID-19 in protecting 
child nutrition would seek to manage vulnerable families’ access to quality food, primarily through 
stimulating the food supply chain and delivering food parcels. The mechanism of protecting families 
from undernourishment using cash benefits is less evident. Moreover, given that undernourishment 
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increases disproportionately in relation to falls in the food supply, stimulus packages towards 
agriculture or food services could include conditions regarding price regulation and distribution 
methods that mitigate inequality in nutrition. In countries where school feeding programmes were in 
place before lockdown, policymakers may wish to consider re-orientating that capacity and 
investment to the provision of food parcels to children at home. 
Among 14 one-off benefits were three food parcel interventions; two more food parcel interventions 
were short term: Armenia (one month) and Kazakhstan (two months). Of the five, only two focused 
specifically on families with children. Stimulus packages aimed at agriculture did not stipulate 
conditions suitable to equitable or progressive supply in the region. 
COVID-19 policies that promote child health
Successful policies to promote child health from previous crises include the provision of health 
insurance to families and access to cash transfers, increasing health care utilization. Evidence for the 
provision of health services also shows these can be effective in reducing child mortality. In contrast, 
the provision of labour market supports can increase parental stress and mental ill health. This is also 
true for periods of austerity, which can also lead to increases in suicide. Following crises, the pro-
vision of cash transfers has, on occasion, been shown to improve adult mental health conditions. 
The social economic analysis suggested the crisis will increase risks of child mortality, put a burden 
on the accessibility of health care utilization and in turn, an increase in out-of-pocket spending, as 
well as have counterintuitive effects on older adolescent suicide rates. These differences in the 
determinants of infant and under-five child mortality and suicide, will determine the types of policy 
responses required. As noted above, overall health expenditure, the size of the health workforce, and 
GDP per capita are consistent conditions for achieving positive outcomes across these health 
indicators – most likely influenced by demand for standardized birth services in contrast to mental 
health supports. Differences in demand for public health services requires a multi-pronged response; 
GDP per capita needs to remain as high as possible and preventative and protective health care 
services need to be bolstered. Personal out-of-pocket costs for health care need to be avoided as this 
links directly to income poverty risks. Public health investment needs to remain high, and for longer 
term protective reasons efforts to increase education achievement and completion rates need to be 
maintained. 
Evidence from Tables 4 and 5, beyond the cash transfer approaches discussed, shows a limited health 
services response. Croatia is providing support for health insurance and Montenegro and the Russian 
Federation are increasing the wages of health workers. Other initiatives include fiscal stimulus 
responses related to wages subsidies, business support, and loans in COVID-19-affected sectors in 
three countries (limiting coverage to sectors of which the private health care sector is part), and the 
exemption of import duties on medical supplies and pharmaceuticals (the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine). In each case, the health responses are likely to benefit the mortality goals more directly 
(where pharmaceutical and secondary health care intervention is more prevalent), unless the 
provision of private counselling services is also stimulated. 
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COVID-19 policies in support of education
The literature review summary in Table 2 shows that school waivers and subsidies during crises have 
worked to improve school attendance, reduce out-of-pocket costs for parents, and so benefit 
household disposable incomes. School feeding programmes and social services for children 
delivered at times of health or economic crisis also have positive direct effects on school enrolment 
and attendance, as well as cognitive development (school feeing also benefits nutrition, but the same 
caveat related to school closures applies). In contrast, post-GFC austerity led to a reduction in 
childcare services – an important precondition to school readiness – linked to the education outcomes 
of many children. Evidence from the review also points to labour market programmes where 
targeting school-aged children led to school dropout. 
In tests undertaken for this report, the economic conditions for learning outcomes were only reported 
in terms of sufficient conditions and were GDP per capita for higher proficiency and Gini (counter-
intuitively) in high and low proficiency. Completion of lower secondary was significantly associated to 
two conditions in the region: the age dependency ratio and the percentage increase in population 
density. 
Aside from school closures, food parcels (which may be adapted during school closures to pick up for 
extra demand due to fewer school meals being provided), cash transfers, and employment policies 
already discussed, no further social protection or stimulus is being offered (or withdrawn) as reported 
in Tables 4 and 5. School fee waivers or supports with other costs related to attendance of school 
(travel, food, offsetting child earnings), as schools reopen, are shown to be effective policies for both 
children’s educational outcomes and family poverty risks. 
COVID-19 policies that prevent youth NEET rates
There is no evidence of the effect of social protection and fiscal stimulus interventions or austerity 
policies directly influencing youth activation, with the exception of the attendance effects reported in 
the education policies. As noted, economic downturns have been shown to affect youth activation 
but evidence on the mitigating effects of social protection in these circumstances is scant. 
In the economic and social conditions tests, GDP per capita is significantly associated with NEET rate: 
when GDP per capita is low, NEET rates are high; when GDP per capita is falling, NEET rates are 
increasing. NEET rates also track to overall labour market participation, service sector size, GDP 
growth, and numbers of adolescents out of school – all meaningful contributors in combination with 
conditions (see Section 4.1). Policies related to these factors in terms of cash payments to the un-
employed, family cash supports, labour market activation policies, and stimulus to business will all 
have an indirect effect on youth activation, as will opening schools, providing youth-tailored labour 
market policies and scholarships, and training opportunities. 
There is no reference to specific interventions for youth, or consideration of conditions specific to 
youth in general policies in the ECA mapping of social protection and fiscal stimulus responses to 
COVID-19 (see Tables 4 and 5). This is a missed opportunity, given the prevalence of labour market 
and employment interventions and learning on youth following the GFC. 
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COVID-19 Polices for preventing violence
Similar to youth activation, there are no findings reported in Table 2 for the effect of crisis-response 
social protection on violence, although indirect stressors related to experiences of interpersonal 
violence include: income poverty; crime; homelessness; poor mental health; and reductions in 
parental caregiving.
The economic and social conditions analysis showed that intentional homicides are significantly 
associated to social conditions, such as political stability, increase in population density, and age 
dependency ratios – where each condition is associated with lower rates of general violence. For 
child mortality risks, only QCA tests were undertaken and no necessary conditions multiple complex 
co-conditions exist (see Section 4.1).
The prevention of violence in ECA countries, as supported through social protection interventions 
and fiscal stimulus, is unclear. Maintaining social cohesion is facilitated with fair and universal 
response to national crises so universality in the accessibility of general support is needed. 
Reflections here speak more to universal approaches to social protection and stimulus and the 
protection of the most vulnerable in austerity. So far, it is unclear how present social protection polies 
can protect all people in the long term, how stimulus will reach the poorest and most marginalised, 
and how austerity will unfold with the potential risk of weakening social cohesion and mental health 
(see Table 2). 
COVID-19 and fiscal stimulus / austerity
Alongside social protection policies, this paper has mapped fiscal stimulus undertaken in the ECA 
region to 28 April 2020. Fiscal stimulus policies are designed to help sectors of the economy survive 
economic downturns through stimulating productivity and growth and by supporting business with 
costs and credit lines. 
Evidence reports in Table 2 map the observed effect stimulus interventions can have, directly and 
indirectly, on children alongside the consequences of austerity. Tirivayi et al (2020) found that fiscal 
stimulus could have an indirect effect on children in the short-and medium-term (one year, or two to 
three years) through reductions in poverty rates and increases in income and real GDP. No direct 
effects on children were found in the short, medium, or long term (three plus years). The authors also 
found that fiscal stimulus could have indirect influence on gender inequality when favouring 
predominantly male sectors. 
In the case of COVID-19, fiscal stimulus has focussed on the business sector and employment support. 
Employment support and labour market programmes are shown to help increase family incomes, adult 
employment, job retention, and adult physical and mental health (see Table 2). To this end, there are 
potential routes by which well-applied fiscal stimuli can improve the well-being of children through 
families, employment, markets and so on (see the ecological framework in Section 2).
When austerity follows a crisis, Tirivayi et al., (2020) report serious and direct consequences for 
children and their services in the medium-term (two or three years following the crisis). These 
include, reductions in childcare services and benefits and, of serious concern to the ECA region, an 
increase in the number of children losing parental care and being given over to child services. Indirect 
negative effects such as homelessness, increased crime rates, poor adult mental health, and 
increased suicide rates were also seen. Along with these worsening social outcomes, a serious and 
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concerning health effect were reports that austerity led, in some cases, to a re-emergence of 
infectious disease outbreaks. 
Table 5 shows a range of fiscal stimulus approaches including: delayed payments or exemptions of 
tax payments, social security contributions, or import duty exemptions of medical supplies; the 
facilitation of credit lines to businesses; payment in the form of wage subsidies are noted; and 
general stimulus/business supports. 
In all cases, details of the exact modalities of stimulus payments were not clear in the source material. 
This needs to be followed up at a country level although on occasion the stimulus packages are 
restricted to sectors affected by COVID, or other sectors such as agriculture in Latvia. What is clearer 
is that countries are employing multiple fiscal policies which have high global costs in comparison to 
social protection, fewer details provided regarding timelines, and slightly longer timelines (the modal 
case is three months compared to one for social protection). There are also fewer conditions on 
receipt of stimulus than on social protection, meaning less regulation. 
Stimulus in ECA countries is mostly directed towards private markets with no evidence on specific 
social service stimulus beyond health. Demand for social services related to child mental health and 
well-being, to violence and abuse, lack of socialization, lost learning, sedentary behaviours, and poor 
nutrition for some (based on school feeding effects), all point to an opportunity for governments to 
meet stimulus and social goals. One major opportunity is by bolstering educational investment as 
schools reopen, following the lockdown through additional funding or through education subsidies 
for parents or fee waivers. In ECA countries with mixed and unstable records on out-of-school 
populations, supports with school costs that reduce household costs directly and indirectly are 
shown to have positive effects on school enrolment and should be considered as a stimulus option 
(social market stimulus) when schools reopen. This will also serve to reduce inequality on exit. 
6.2 Summary recommendations for COVID-19 social protection responses in ECA 
countries
Given the expected depth and persistence of the economic downturn, the impact of this on unequal 
poverty risks in ECA countries, and the expectation that the near-poor population will soon become 
poor populations, social protection benefits in the region should:
  Maximize the chance of meeting the SDG goals, despite the crisis,– recognizing the both the 
pervasive impact of COVID-19, as well as existing inequality – by meeting the standards of 
progressive universalism in COVID-19 benefits, where payments are available to all families with 
children and with increments paid in cases of families with higher need related to size, disabilities, 
health, employment status etc. The benefits should be indexed to allow for fluctuation in inflation 
and living costs, preferably to a retail price index. 
  Recognize that existing social protection systems already exclude the most vulnerable due to 
various conditions of eligibility. Building on existing systems needs to include expansion of 
coverage to the most vulnerable group if this is to avoid entrenching the most extreme forms of 
poverty. 
  Implement COVID-19 reforms that learn from GFC trends and which adapted to COVID-19 
lockdowns. Let social protection responses reflect the reality of the recovery timeline and shape 
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(V-shape, U-shape or L-shape) in the country. This requires setting out longer-term plans for social 
protection, setting payment schedules accordingly.
  Pay benefits at adequate amounts, raising whole families – regardless of size and structure and 
circumstance – above minimum income levels of the national poverty threshold. This requires 
increments related to family size, family structure, for children with disabilities and importantly, by 
child age (when care responsibilities can crowd out work, and development stages would benefit 
from higher overall rates of investment). 
  Recognize that existing definitions of poverty and vulnerability are not COVID-19-proof so benefits 
targeted and costed to the caseloads defined by poverty ‘pre-COVID’ will need to flexible to 
expansion in the short- and medium-term. In short, new policies need to account for the ‘new poor’ 
as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. 
  Ensure social protection benefits are complementary to employment supports and include active 
labour market conditions that are not punitive to maximize the economic recovery without imposing 
stresses on families, leading to poorer family functioning and health consequences. Families are 
not responsible for the economic downturn and are not responsible for its recovery. Under present 
conditions, they are also not provided with the resources to stimulate the recovery. Stronger 
regulations and responsibilities should be put on businesses while fiscal stimulus options are 
available to them. 
  Provide food parcels to help families who have recently relied on school feeding programmes, 
among many others, particularly in light of the realities of social lockdown. In cases where 
agriculture is stimulated to bolster food supply, and if food supply is a risk, ECA countries could 
benefit from regulation to maximize equitable supply of nutrition. 
  Recognize that health access is improved by cash transfers but also by supports for health insurance 
and fees waivers. So far these types of interventions are underutilized in ECA countries and could 
be supported. Out-of-pocket health costs are determinant of SDG health outcomes in the region, as 
is poverty. 
  In future iterations of COVID-19 reforms, acknowledge the consequences of social protection and 
stimulus or austerity reforms in the areas of child protection, education and youth activation. Goals 
in each area have the potential to be influenced by social protection and fiscal stimulus policies. 
Recognizing complementarity in policy goals is the first step towards improving effectiveness and 
efficiency in public responses for children (OECD, 2015). 
  Entirely avoid austerity in ways that put social development goals for children, and their related 
investments, at risk. Should fiscal stimulus lead to austerity there will be serious impacts on families 
and children. 
 
Where countries need to find costs to undertake the necessary expansions, a rebalancing of present 
fiscal stimulus and social protection options would be the consideration. The added benefit to 
strengthening the social system in a time of crisis is the potential it has to outlive the crisis and 
further strengthen social development priorities, specifically anti-poverty measures, in countries 
across ECA. 
92
Supporting Families and Children Beyond COVID-19:  Social protection in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
However, in regard to costing and how it might inform the social protection response assessment and 
the risk of austerity responses in the short- or medium-term, it must be noted that less than half of 
COVID-19 social policies were costed and in no cases is it clear the amount of global cost transferred 
(as opposed to being spent on administration of the benefit). 
Work is needed to better understand the global costs of these benefits at the national level. Costs are 
important for understanding the impact on sustainability and affordability of social protection 
benefits and overall government debt. Both will partly dictate calls of austerity and how cuts will 
impact on social protection policies. In 2016, government debts as a proportion of GDP in ECA ranged 
from 14.2 per cent in the Russian Federation to 80.7 per cent in Albania – around 42 per cent on 
average for 10 countries with data in 2016 (see Annex Table 1.3). For comparison, following the GFC 
and beginning in 2010 when the United Kingdom undertook a comprehensive austerity drive, 
including major cuts to benefits directly and indirectly affecting families and children, government 
debt in the country stood at 81.7 per cent, despite cuts (in 2016 debt was 115 percent of GDP, 
Richardson 2010). 
Following the collection of better data on global costs, the value of understanding the amount of global 
cost transferred is important for two assessment reasons: firstly, to more accurately assess what the 
social impact will be; secondly, to assess whether new reforms are more cost effective than reforms 
built on existing social protection programmes. Thorough research on global gross and net cost 
effectiveness would add vital information to decision-making about crisis reforms, as well as decisions 
regarding justification for establishing stronger social protection infrastructure in normal times. 
With no COVID-19 vaccine in sight, continued physical distancing, an existing changes to work 
patterns, schooling, and travel are all likely to continue. Who people see, where and how they source 
goods and services, where they work, where they take leisure may all change. This will lead to 
innovation in how business is done, how markets are managed, and which work becomes essential. 
Fundamental changes to living conditions (relationships, resources, family functioning, work) 
imposed by the pandemic will inevitably trigger discourse on how national governments plan their 
public policies and social protection policies. This may include austerity but equally, may be an 
opportunity to strengthen social protection schemes – and other important social sectors of 
education and health – for the benefit of children, families and society as a whole. Advocates for 
children need to be prepared for this discourse.
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6.3 Final remarks: COVID-19 and the future
As countries in the ECA region seek to maintain their ambition to achieve the SDGs by 2030, responses
in relation to public policy and specifically, social protection, on exiting the COVID-19 crisis should be 
sensitive to the needs of future generations, not only in terms of maintaining basic incomes and living 
standards, but in dealing with the multiple and complex risks that a once-in-a-lifetime crisis brings to 
their economies, societies, communities, families, and children. 
The evidence presented in this report has shown that COVID-19 represents a serious challenge for 
ECA countries. Social protection of fiscal stimulus policies, although clearly aligned to ensure income 
supports in the short term and maintain productivity, are not fully equipped to address the multiple 
needs of families and children, and the present needs of families and children are likely to be accent-
uated by inevitable economic downturn and expectations for austerity – both of which may be 
protracted.
The story of this crisis, like all economic and social crises, is one of inequality. Pre-existing inequality 
determines who suffers most in these times. Inequality in the initial responses to the crisis will 
further exacerbate underlying inequalities. When exiting the crisis and designing policies to help 
societies recover, stimulus and austerity can be unequal too, with huge private and public costs to 
follow. Today, many states in ECA can still manage the recovery from the crisis in ways that do not 
exacerbate inequalities for children and families, in turn protecting their futures and the futures of the 
region’s economies and societies. 
As it stands, across ECA countries the social protection benefits offered to families with children in 
the majority of cases are designed to fill a short-term gap in need, as if the long-term consequences 
of the economic downturn can be addressed later. In other words, although the short-term benefits 
are needed to help families through a period of low income, related to job insecurity and lockdown, 
for those in most need these will not constitute an opportunity to save or invest in family or children. 
They are providing the basics for survival and as important as this is, it stands to reason that long-
term shocks related to economic downturn experienced by families will not be averted by these 
responses. Instead, governments are relying on fiscal stimulus to protect themselves from the long- 
term downturns, despite the lessons of the GFC and the inequality in the reach of fiscal stimulus. 
With these points in mind, a case may be made to strengthen social protection through longer 
payment schedules, additional services support (social stimulus), and the introduction of greater 
regulations, with an expectation of private sector stimulus in the next round of reforms. 
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ANNEX 1: SUPPORTING CHARTS AND TABLES
Annex Table 1.1: Indicators used in the Analysis, Outcomes Determinants 
and Contexts (2006 – 2018) 








Proportion of population living below the 
national poverty line (%)
World Development 
Indicators y   
Proportion of children moderately or 
severely wasted (%) under 5
World Development 
Indicators y   
Under-five mortality rate, by sex (deaths 
per 1,000 live births)
World Development 
Indicators y   
Neonatal (under 1 month) mortality rate 
(deaths per 1,000 live births)
World Development 
Indicators y   
Proportion of children and young people 
achieving a minimum proficiency level in 
reading (%) Lower Secondary
World Development 
Indicators y   
Proportion of youth not in education, 
employment or training, by sex and age 
(%) 15-24
World Development 
Indicators y   
Intentional Homicide rates (0-19) World Development 
Indicators y   
Suicide Rates (15-19) World Development 
Indicators   y
Demo-
graphics
Population pyramids (see Annex 2) Populationpyramid.net   y
Age dependency ratio (% of working age 
population)
World Development 
Indicators   y
Age dependency ratio, young (% of 
working age population)
World Development 
Indicators  y  
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) World Development 
Indicators   y
International migrant stock (% of 
population)
World Development 
Indicators  y  
Population density (people per sq. km of 
land area)
World Development 
Indicators   y
Refugee population by country or 
territory of asylum
World Development 
Indicators    
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Urban population growth (annual %) World Development 
Indicators   y
Population living in slums World Development 
Indicators    
Economic 
indicators
GDP per capita (current US$) World Development 
Indicators  y  
GDP growth (annual %) World Development 
Indicators  y  
Central government debt, total (% of 
GDP)
World Development 
Indicators   y
Net ODA received per capita (current 
US$)
World Development 
Indicators   y
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators   y
Industry value added (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators   y
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators   y
Services, value added (% of GDP) World Development 
Indicators  y y
External balance on goods and services 
(current US$)
World Development 
Indicators   y
Expendi-
tures
Public social protection expenditure, 




Current health expenditure per capita, 
PPP (current international US$)
WHO  y y
Domestic general government health 




Domestic private health expenditure per 
capita, PPP (current international US$)
WHO   y
External health expenditure per capita, 
PPP (current international US$)
WHO   y
Out-of-pocket expenditure (% of current 
health expenditure)
WHO  y  
Government expenditure on secondary 
education as % of GDP (%)
UNESCO  y  
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Adequacy of benefits (%) - Cash transfer World Development 
Indicators  y  
Average per capita transfer - Cash 
transfer
World Development 
Indicators   y
Coverage (%) - Cash transfer World Development 




Physicians (per 1,000 people) World Development 
Indicators  y  
Nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people) World Development 
Indicators  y  
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people) World Development 
Indicators  y  
People using safely managed sanitation 
services (% of population)
World Development 
Indicators  y  
Children out of school (% of primary 
school age)
World Development 
Indicators   y
Adolescents out of school (% of lower 
secondary school age)
World Development 
Indicators  y y
Food supply (kcal/capita/day) FAOSTAT y
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Prevalence of undernourishment (% of 
population)
World Development 
Indicators  y  
Mortality rate attributed to household 
and ambient air pollution, age-
standardized (per 100,000 population)
WHO
  y
Labour force participation rate, total (% 




Self-employed, total (% of total 
employment) (modelled ILO estimate)
ILO   y
Employment to population ratio, ages 
15-24, total (%) (national estimate)
World Development 
Indicators  y  
GINI index (World Bank estimate) World Development 
Indicators  y  
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 
people)
World Development 
Indicators  y  
Personal remittances, received (current 
US$)
World Development 
Indicators  y  




Rule of Law World Governance 
Indicators y
100
Supporting Families and Children Beyond COVID-19:  Social protection in Southern and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Annex Table 1.2: Lockdowns by date in response to COVID-19 in Southern 
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
 






Albania 9-Mar 9-Mar 9-Mar 9-Mar 9-Mar
Armenia 16-Mar  16-Mar 16-Mar 16-Mar4
Azerbaijan 7-Mar 31-Mar 10-Mar 16-Mar 29-Feb
Belarus      
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 17-Mar 17-Mar 17-Mar 17-Mar 10-Mar
4
Bulgaria 5-Mar 13-Mar 13-Mar 13-Mar 18-Mar
Croatia 11-Mar 14-Mar 9-Mar 17-Mar 19-Mar
Estonia 12-Mar 25-Mar 12-Mar 26-Mar 17-Mar
Georgia 29-Feb NA 16-Mar 16-Mar 16-Mar
Kazakhstan 16-Mar 30-Mar 12-Mar 19-Mar1 17-Mar
Kyrgyzstan 16-Mar 12-Mar 25-Mar 25-Mar2 17-Mar
Latvia 12-Mar 12-Mar 12-Mar 12-Mar 17-Mar
Moldova, the 
Republic of 11-Mar  10-Mar 24-Mar 10-Mar
Montenegro 13-Mar  13-Mar 13-Mar 13-Mar
North Macedonia 10-Mar  NA 16-Mar 16-Mar
Romania 11-Mar 31-Mar 8-Mar 31-Mar (T)3 11-Feb5
Russian 
Federation 21-Mar 30-Mar 10-Mar 5-Mar 30-Jan
6
Serbia 16-Mar 21-Mar 11-Mar 21-Mar 11-Mar4
Tajikistan    15-Mar  
Turkey 16-Mar 22-Mar 16-Mar 12-Mar 6-Feb4
Turkmenistan      
Ukraine 12-Mar 17-Mar 12-Mar 12-Mar  
Uzbekistan 16-Mar 16-Mar 16-Mar 24-Mar (T) 17-Mar4
 
Notes: 1Nur-Sultan and Almaty under quarantine. 2Main cities. 3Night Curfew. ‘T’ denotes closure of public transport. 4Bans from 
high-risk countries or regions. 5Quarantine for arrivals from China. 6Bans from Germany, Italy, France, and Spain.
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Annex Table 1.3: Additional reference statistics: economic and social context 
Net ODA as % of 
GDP per capita
Central govt debt Balance of trade Rate of informal 
labour market
Adequacy of 
benefits (%) - 
Cash Transfer






Albania 2.3% 80.7 -13.7% 9.0 9.8 2.1
Armenia 1.1% -15.7% 24.8 19.6 14.3 0.5
Azerbaijan 0.2% 16.6% 0.1 11.3
Belarus 0.2% 40.0 1.1% 81.2 27.3




Georgia 3.3% 42.1 -10.6% 17.4
Kazakhstan 0.0% 16.8 12.2% 7.6 16.6 0.0
Kyrgyzstan 5.1% 60.5 -35.7% 11.2 6.5
Latvia -0.2% 1.5
Moldova, the Rep. of 2.0% 31.9 -25.7% 11.4 12.5 1.3
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Net ODA as % of 
GDP per capita
Central govt debt Balance of trade Rate of informal 
labour market
Adequacy of 
benefits (%) - 
Cash Transfer






North Macedonia 1.3% -12.6%
Romania -3.2% 7.9 52.6 0.4
Russian Federation 14.2 10.1% 6.0 57.7
Serbia 2.1% -8.5% 14.0 18.9 11.6 1.7
Tajikistan 5.3% 1.0
Turkey 0.2% 31.9 -1.1% 5.7 7.0
Turkmenistan 0.0% 10.2%
Ukraine 0.9% 71.8 -8.1% 13.9 23.1 1.2
Uzbekistan 1.1% -9.6%
Average 2% 44.3 -5.8% 18.6 16.1 17.5 1.1
responses 17 10.0 22 3.0 14.0 16.0 10.0
Maximum 5% 80.7 16.6% 24.8 81.2 57.7 2.1
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Albania 5268.8 33.2 508.7 47.9 55.9 21.6 1.6 6.2 39.9 FALSE 104.6 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.6 2.9 11.9 9.8 9.0 759.7 58.0 0.8 4.1
Armenia 4212.1 34.4 494.0 52.6 58.9 21.7 1.8 4.3 48.2 9.3 103.7 2.4 6.9 8.2 5.6 4.2 7.6 14.3 19.6 876.9 80.6 1.3 5.2
Azerbai-
jan 4721.2 FALSE 146.7 35.2 66.1 FALSE 1.9 2.5  FALSE 120.3 2.0 3.9 0.5 7.0 4.7 8.2 11.3 0.1 1193.1 78.9 FALSE 1.4





6065.7 FALSE 438.7 55.0 46.7 23.1 1.3 2.5 21.6 7.6 64.9 1.2   6.3 3.5 FALSE 5.1 8.8 1123.4 28.7 3.4 3.6
Bulgaria 9272.6 40.4 207.6 59.2 55.2 20.7 1.5 3.6 64.4 FALSE 64.7 1.5 11.7 10.1 5.3 6.8 18.5 FALSE FALSE 1577.9 48.0 1.6 3.1
Croatia 14909.7 30.4 356.6 59.0 51.5 25.6 1.4 2.5 58.5 FALSE 73.1 1.1 1.4 1.3 8.1 5.6 21.6 FALSE FALSE 1705.2 15.4 FALSE 2.6
Estonia 23266.3 30.4 1104.0 60.2 63.1 41.7 1.6 2.9 97.4 FALSE 30.4 2.2 2.4 1.3 6.5 5.0 17.0 FALSE FALSE 1987.7 22.7 1.3 4.8
Georgia 4717.1 36.4 390.8 60.3 67.6 28.3 2.1 7.9 27.2 34.1 65.3 1.0 0.8 0.2 4.1 2.6 10.6 17.4 FALSE 797.2 55.6 FALSE 4.8
Kazakh-
stan 9812.6 27.5 79.8 55.5 70.5 FALSE 2.7 2.5 99.0 FALSE 6.8 5.0 1.0  FALSE 6.7 5.4 16.6 7.6 858.8 35.6 2.0 4.1
Kyrgyz-
stan 1281.4 27.7 230.9 49.8 61.4 34.4 3.0 7.1  9.7 32.9 4.2 0.3 3.0 FALSE 4.5 9.0 6.5 11.2 240.2 57.6 FALSE 3.5
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3227.3 25.7 411.2 53.7 41.7 19.3 1.3   63.5 123.5 3.2 9.0 15.0 4.5 5.8 18.1 12.5 11.4 480.4 46.3 2.0 3.4
Montene-




6083.7 34.2 700.1 55.1 54.9 17.4 1.5 3.2 16.6 8.3 82.6 1.5 0.9  3.8 4.4 FALSE FALSE FALSE 934.6 35.4 FALSE 2.7




11288.9 37.5 10.1 54.1 61.6 28.3 1.8 2.5 61.3 FALSE 8.8 9.2 0.1 0.2 8.6 8.2 15.6 57.7 6.0 1329.3 40.5 FALSE 2.3
Serbia 7246.7 36.2 208.9 51.0 53.9 21.1 1.5 5.7 24.7 3.6 79.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 6.1 5.7 23.4 11.6 18.9 1322.6 40.5 0.9 4.4
Tajikistan 826.6 34.0 160.2 42.1 43.6 23.3 3.6   26.0 65.6  0.5  5.2 4.8 FALSE 1.0 FALSE 208.5 66.1 FALSE 7.3
Turkey 9370.2 41.9 17.7 54.3 52.4 35.0 2.1 2.5 65.2 8.1 107.0  5.1 8.9 2.6 2.7 13.5 7.0 5.7 1089.2 16.5 FALSE 2.8
Turkmen-
istan 6966.6 FALSE 249.2 FALSE 65.0 FALSE 2.8 5.4 100.0 FALSE 12.5    4.6 7.4 FALSE FALSE FALSE 1116.9 76.2 FALSE 6.2
Ukraine 3095.2 26.1 32.7 51.3 53.7 27.6 1.4 3.5 68.5 19.0 77.0 6.2 8.0 3.6 7.1 8.8 22.2 23.1 13.9 534.2 54.3 1.7 3.3
Uzbeki-
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5032.9 30.7 144.6 48.6 53.5 22.9 1.6 3.0 47.1 14.0 48.5 1.8 1.6 2.2 5.0 4.4 11.9 9.4 6.2 801.8 35.3 1.3 3.3
 
Source: Annex Table 1.1.
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0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0%
 
Notes: No data for North Macedonia.
Source: populationpyramid.net, 2020. 
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ANNEX 3: METHODOLOGICAL NOTES
A3.1 For fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
The analytical tool of this study employs a fuzzy-set analysis, a relatively novel technique within the 
broader Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methodology (Cebotari and Vink, 2013; Ragin 2009; 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The QCA methodology is geared towards capturing the 
configurational nature of complex phenomena, such as those linked to vulnerabilities experienced by 
children in different contexts. 
In contrast to traditional quantitative analyses oriented towards capturing the empirical relevance of 
independent variables, the QCA does not make such assumption of independence. Instead, the QCA 
uses mathematical algorithms of the Boolean logic to assume conjunctural causation and aims to 
analyse how individual conditions alone, or in combination with each other, explain weaker or 
stronger values of an outcome. By analysing both sides of an outcome, the QCA takes into account 
the asymmetrical nature of complex phenomena. This unique feature of QCA sets it apart from other 
methodologies and is the first time this type of analysis is being employed to inform the evidence 
base of an agency within the United Nations. 
The QCA is suitable for small and medium N-samples normally ranging between 15 and 50 cases. It 
employs a case-oriented approach, in that a good knowledge of cases in the sample is essential to 
select relevant conditions and to explain interlinkages between theory and findings. Cases can be any 
unit that fits the contextual logic of the analysis. Similarly, the outcome and conditions can employ 
data at micro-, meso-, and macro-level. The ability to include and analyse data at different levels is 
one major advantage of the QCA methodology.
The QCA’s fuzzy-set analysis is based on defining and analysing subset relations of necessary and 
sufficient conditions leading to the presence or absence of the outcome. The analysis employs three 
steps, as follows:
1. The conceptual, empirical and theoretical evidence feeds in raw data composed of an outcome 
and conditions for the pool of cases. The raw data is collected using available statistics, or 
gathered using in-depth knowledge of each case. 
2. The raw values of data for the outcome and conditions are calibrated into partial set membership 
scores using middle-, upper-, and lower-level thresholds informed by evidence or data 
characteristics. 
For the analysis of this study, the calibration used the average values as a middle-level threshold 
when defining the set membership in the outcome and conditions for the pool of countries. Then, the 
½ standard deviation values above the mean were used as the upper-level threshold, while the ½ 
standard deviation values below the mean were used as the lower-level threshold to define the set 
membership. One exception was the calibration of poverty outcome, where the value of 1 was used 
as the middle-level threshold, with the ½ standard deviation above and below the mean as 
thresholds for the upper-level and lower-level set membership, respectively. This exception in 
calibration was motivated by the structure of the poverty outcome, for whom the average values 
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cannot be calculated. Instead, the poverty outcome includes ratio of the poverty rate in a given year 
as a ration of the average poverty rate in a country as recorded in the last decade. The value of 1 is 
the natural threshold, and value below and above 1 represent a fall or an increase in national poverty 
rates, respectively, according to national measures.  
 
The calibration using the three thresholds leads to fuzzy-set membership scores for the outcome and 
conditions that are included in the interval between [0] (non-membership) and [1] (full membership). 
The calibration process is sensitive to variations in the use of cut-off points. The current study pays 
particular attention to the standardized nature of establishing the cut-off thresholds as described 
above. 
3. The calibrated scores are used to analyse the configuration of necessary and sufficient conditions 
leading to the presence and the absence of the outcome. The status of being a necessary condition 
is fulfilled when the outcome is consistently a subset of a condition in the pool of cases. In other 
words, the fuzzy-set scores of the outcome are lower or equal to the fuzzy-set scores of the 
condition (Yi ≤ Xi) if to meet the necessity criteria. Inversely, the status of being a sufficient 
condition is when the condition is a subset of the outcome, where the fuzzy set scores of the 
condition are lower or equal to the fuzzy-set score of the outcome (Xi ≤ Yi). 
 For the analysis of sufficient conditions, the parsimonious solution is retained to present the 
results of this study. The parsimonious solution allows for the use of the entire spectrum of 
configurations that are covered by cases or not to explain the outcome.
 The analyses of necessary and sufficient conditions employs two parameters of fit. One parameter 
is ‘consistency’ and indicates the degree to which the subset relation is approximated. Higher 
consistency values indicate a better subset relation and a better fit with the status of being a 
necessary or sufficient condition in the pool of cases. A consistency score of 0.80 is generally seen 
as the minimum accepted value for being a sufficient condition. For the analysis of necessary 
conditions, a minimum accepted consistency threshold is 0.80 but a consistency threshold of 0.85 
and higher is advised. 
 The second parameter of fit is ‘coverage’, which indicates the relation in size between the 
condition set and the outcome set. For the analysis of sufficient conditions, the coverage shows 
the proportion of cases covered by a condition or combination of conditions. For the analysis of 
necessity, the coverage indicates the relevance and trivialness of the condition. 
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A3.2 For elasticity of child well-being measures
To assess how short-term shocks to aggregate income affect children and young person’s welfare in 
ECA, the first step is to build a database of macro-economic and macro-social indicators from 2006 to 
2018 covering all countries. As detailed in table A1.1. data is obtained from different sources.11 Some 
of the indicators presented gaps in the time series. Missing values were imputed as follows. For those 
countries having less than five years of missing data points, we replaced missing values with 
plausible values calculated as the moving average of the last three years (if missing were at the end 
of the series) or as the moving average of the following three periods (if missing were at the 
beginning of the series). In the presence of a gap in the middle of the series we took the average of 
the year before and after and substituted the value accordingly. Countries with more than five years 
of missing values in any of the indicators within each specification were dropped from the analysis. 
With this data, the within transformation estimation procedure is used to analyse the relationship 
between aggregate income and the outcome variables (see Annex Table 3.1). The advantages of the 
within transformation estimation procedure are that it can allow the individual-and/or time-specific 
effects to be correlated with the explanatory variables. Time-fixed effects that control for global or 
region-wide shocks affecting all countries, and country-fixed effects that control for unobserved 
country specific characteristics that do not vary over time, are included to reduce concerns about the 
exclusion restriction. 
The aim of the analysis is not to infer causality but rather, to evaluate the extent to which fluctuations 
in aggregate income are associated with children and young people outcomes. To analyse the 
relationship between aggregate income on children and young people outcome, regressions of the 
following specification form are run:
Yct = β log GDPct-1 + αc+ δt+ εct,
where Yct is the outcome variable for country c at time t; log GDPct-1 is the lagged natural logarithm of 
per capita GDP; αc is a set of country fixed effects; δt is a set of time fixed effects; and εct is the error 
term. Whenever possible, the outcome variable Yct is transformed into natural logarithm. In this case, 
the log/log regression model can be interpreted as elasticity of variations in GDP per capita with 
respect to the outcome variable. 
The relationship between the outcome variable and aggregate income can be mediated by other 
indicators thus violating the independence between aggregate income and the error term. To resolve 
this, the baseline regressions are augmented to estimate the following specification: 
Yct = β log GDPct-1 + λXct-1+ αc+ δt+ εct,
where λXct-1 is a series of lagged control variables, which include population density; age dependency 
ratio; income inequality; health systems and expenditure; labour force participation and employment 
rate; education level completion rate; and food supply and governance indicators. 
11 Further information on data coverage is available for each indicator from the trend charts reported in chapter 3 or upon direct 
request to the authors.
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One limitation of this approach is the potential reverse causality occurring between GDP per capita 
and the outcome variable. From a methodological standpoint, the presence of reverse causality might 
bias upwards the FE estimate of the impact of GDP. However, to mitigate the issue of endogeneity of 
GDP on the outcome variables, the value of GDP is lagged. Lagged explanatory variables are a 
common strategy used in response to endogeneity concerns and simultaneity bias (Vergara, 2010; 
Clemens et al., 2012) although recently subjected to several critics (Reed, 2014; Bellemare, 2017). The 
argument is that although current values of GDP might be endogenous to SDG outcomes, it is 
unlikely that past values of GDP are subject to the same problem. A natural development of such 
analysis would be to understand the causal linkages between GDP and the outcome variables by 
instrumenting GDP within an instrumental variable setting. Coefficients produced using a level-log 
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Annex Table 3.1: Full statistical tables for elasticity analysis and regression analysis 
Independent 
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mortality 
rate under-5 













































Log GDP per 
capita (t-1) 
-7.599*** -2.095** -2.120** -1.878* -3.179*** -1.222** -2.220** -1.401*** -0.672 -1.715*** -1.140***









   0.154        








   -3.794***        




sq. km of 
land area) 
(t-1) 
 -39.17*** -39.09*** -38.34***  -20.89*** -15.18***  1.806  -0.382
 (3.570) (3.567) (3.675)  (2.262) (5.199)  (1.895)  (1.456)
Age 
dependency 




 0.0398 0.0398 0.0312  -0.0224 0.0537  0.0441  0.0591**
 (0.0589) (0.0590) (0.0787)  (0.0427) (0.0951)  (0.0276)  (0.0231)
Primary 
completion 




 -0.0863*** -0.0863*** -0.100***  -0.0512*** -0.0441     
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mortality 
rate under-5 



















































 -0.0603*** -0.0606*** -0.0633**  -0.0333*** -0.0499**     




 0.0940 0.0474 0.155  -0.0394 0.121     




  0.174         
  (0.315)         




      -0.531***     





        0.0683***  0.0527***





        -2.398**  -0.658




        -0.506**  0.0977
        (0.242)  (0.0799)
Constant 80.65*** 201.2*** 201.1*** 218.3*** 35.58*** 111.2*** 93.70*** 28.91*** 49.75*** 30.45*** 31.65***
 (11.11) (13.74) (13.78) (16.05) (5.910) (9.550) (25.50) (3.742) (11.56) (3.181) (9.163)
Observations 276 252 252 228 276 252 121 184 175 148 139
R-squared 0.978 0.985 0.985 0.986 0.969 0.978 0.991 0.880 0.894 0.947 0.967
Year Fixed 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Mortality 
rate under-5 














































Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.228 0.634 0.634 0.690 0.143 0.544 0.556 0.0449 0.133 0.218 0.434
Number of 
Countries 23 21 21 19 23 21 20 16 16 13 13
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Annex Table 3.1: Full statistical tables for elasticity analysis and regression analysis 
Independent 
variables
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)
























































(% of age 
group)
Log GDP per 
capita (t-1) 
-7.268*** -6.705*** 5.358*** 5.303*** -0.0805 0.0484 -0.0847 -2.097*** -2.015*** -1.661*** -0.833 0.313









      0.0711      









      -0.0246      




sq. km of 
land area) 
(t-1) 
 -15.54  2.549   0.141   -17.11***  39.81***
 (19.00)  (5.531)   (0.224)   (3.651)  (11.11)
Age 
dependency 




 0.141  0.0281   -0.0150***   -0.242***  1.049***
 (0.246)  (0.127)   (0.00561)   (0.0488)  (0.273)
Primary 
completion 




 0.0498           
 (0.0493)           




 0.901           
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(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23)

































































 -0.682**  0.120      -0.0562  -0.401





     -2.223*** -2.296***      






        -0.626** -0.990***   
        (0.278) (0.231)   
Rule of Law         -0.530 1.345   
        (1.266) (1.016)   
Constant 85.93*** 164.6* -40.14*** -58.48** 17.79*** 34.53*** 36.30*** 21.99*** 21.10*** 100.8*** 101.8*** -93.76*
 (24.28) (83.35) (8.665) (29.00) (0.524) (1.930) (2.565) (5.369) (5.085) (16.39) (24.57) (54.67)
             
Observa-
tions 131 119 156 156 231 231 209 215 215 215 178 178
R-squared 0.923 0.945 0.809 0.811 0.995 0.997 0.997 0.866 0.870 0.900 0.543 0.590
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.0519 0.345 0.146 0.154 0.0153 0.318 0.337 0.0460 0.0741 0.288 0.000382 0.103
Number of 
Countries 12 11 13 13 21 21 19 18 18 18 17 17
t statistics in brackets * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors applied.
Source: Author’s calculations of data reported in Annex Table 1.1.
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